On Tue, Dec 27, 2016 at 11:39:57PM +0100, Stephan Müller wrote: > The random_ready callback mechanism is intended to replicate the > getrandom system call behavior to in-kernel users. As the getrandom > system call unblocks with crng_init == 1, trigger the random_ready > wakeup call at the same time. It was deliberate that random_ready would only get triggered with crng_init==2. In general I'm assuming kernel callers really want real randomness (as opposed to using prandom), where as there's a lot of b.s. userspace users of kernel randomness (for things that really don't require cryptographic randomness, e.g., for salting Python dictionaries, systemd/udev using /dev/urandom for non-cryptographic, non-security applications etc.) - Ted -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
