Hi Eric,
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 6:37 PM, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> I agree, and the current code is wrong; but do note that this proposal is
> correct for poly1305_setrkey() but not for poly1305_setskey() and
> poly1305_blocks(). In the latter two cases, 4-byte alignment of the source
> buffer is *not* guaranteed. Although crypto_poly1305_update() will be called
> with a 4-byte aligned buffer due to the alignmask set on poly1305_alg, the
> algorithm operates on 16-byte blocks and therefore has to buffer partial blocks.
> If some number of bytes that is not 0 mod 4 is buffered, then the buffer will
> fall out of alignment on the next update call. Hence, get_unaligned_le32() is
> actually needed on all the loads, since the buffer will, in general, be of
> unknown alignment.
Hmm... The general data flow that strikes me as most pertinent is
something like:
struct sk_buff *skb = get_it_from_somewhere();
skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
num_frags = skb_cow_data(skb, ..., ...);
struct scatterlist sg[num_frags];
sg_init_table(sg, num_frags);
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, ..., ...);
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, sg, sg, len);
blkcipher_walk_virt_block(&desc, &walk, BLOCK_SIZE);
while (walk.nbytes >= BLOCK_SIZE) {
size_t chunk_len = rounddown(walk.nbytes, BLOCK_SIZE);
poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, walk.src.virt.addr, chunk_len);
blkcipher_walk_done(&desc, &walk, walk.nbytes % BLOCK_SIZE);
}
if (walk.nbytes) {
poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.nbytes);
blkcipher_walk_done(&desc, &walk, 0);
}
Is your suggestion that that in the final if block, walk.src.virt.addr
might be unaligned? Like in the case of the last fragment being 67
bytes long?
If so, what a hassle. I hope the performance overhead isn't too
awful... I'll resubmit taking into account your suggestions.
By the way -- offlist benchmarks sent to me concluded that using the
unaligned load helpers like David suggested is just as fast as that
handrolled bit magic in the v1.
Regards,
Jason
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