Alexander Holler <holler@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > Am 02.05.2013 16:09, schrieb Alexander Holler: >> I don't see any real use case where checking the validity dates of X.509 >> certificates at parsing time adds any security gain. In contrast, doing so >> makes MODSIGN unusable on systems without a RTC (or systems with a possible >> wrong date in a existing RTC, or systems where the RTC is read after the keys >> got loaded). >> >> If something really cares about the dates, it should check them at the time >> when the certificates are used, not when they are loaded and parsed. >> >> So just remove the validity check of the dates in the parser. >> >> Signed-off-by: Alexander Holler <holler@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > As it just happened to me again and I've recently posted some patches > which do make it possible to experience the problem on x86 systems too, > here is a reminder. > > To replay the problem (on x86 or any other arch), apply the 3 patches in > this series: > > https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/6/5/430 > > build a kernel with CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y and start that kernel with > hctosys=none as kernel command line parameter. > > This will disable the "persistent" clock (and any RTC), thus the kernel > will refuse to load modules because it doesn't has a valid time when > loading the certificate. > > Regards, > > Alexander Holler David? Thanks, Rusty. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
