Am 02.05.2013 16:09, schrieb Alexander Holler: > I don't see any real use case where checking the validity dates of X.509 > certificates at parsing time adds any security gain. In contrast, doing so > makes MODSIGN unusable on systems without a RTC (or systems with a possible > wrong date in a existing RTC, or systems where the RTC is read after the keys > got loaded). > > If something really cares about the dates, it should check them at the time > when the certificates are used, not when they are loaded and parsed. > > So just remove the validity check of the dates in the parser. > > Signed-off-by: Alexander Holler <holler@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx As it just happened to me again and I've recently posted some patches which do make it possible to experience the problem on x86 systems too, here is a reminder. To replay the problem (on x86 or any other arch), apply the 3 patches in this series: https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/6/5/430 build a kernel with CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y and start that kernel with hctosys=none as kernel command line parameter. This will disable the "persistent" clock (and any RTC), thus the kernel will refuse to load modules because it doesn't has a valid time when loading the certificate. Regards, Alexander Holler -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
