On Sun, Aug 20, 2006 at 06:49:08PM +0400, Solar Designer wrote: > On Sun, Aug 20, 2006 at 10:04:03AM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 20, 2006 at 04:23:46AM +0400, Solar Designer wrote: > > > The attached patch actually defines ecb_encrypt_iv() and > > > ecb_decrypt_iv() functions that perform ECB encryption/decryption > > > ignoring the IV, yet return -ENOSYS (just like nocrypt_iv would). > > > The result is no more Oopses and no infoleaks either. > > > > Can the cryptoloop patch use CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CFB or CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CTR > > and so be redirected to nocrypt() which will leave uninitialized memory > > too ? > > At least patch-cryptoloop-jari-2.4.22.0 in particular will only do CBC > (default, preferred) or ECB (if requested); it won't attempt to use CFB > or CTR. > > Regarding nocrypt*(): > > > I wonder whether we shouldn't consider that those functions must at > > least clear the memory area that was submitted to them, such as > > proposed below. It would also fix the problem for potential other > > users. > > This makes sense to me, although it is not perfect as Herbert has > correctly pointed out: > > > If the user is ignoring the error value here then you're in serious > > trouble anyway since they've just lost all their data. > > Can we maybe define working but IV-ignoring functions for ECB (like I > did), but use memory-clearing nocrypt*() for CFB and CTR (as long as > these are not supported)? Of course, all of these will return -ENOSYS. I thought we would not have to protect users from shooting themselves in the foot (right now they get an oops). But I agree that the cost of protecting them is close to zero so we probably should do it. If Herbert is OK, do you care to provide a new patch ? > Alexander Thanks, willy - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
