On Sun, Aug 20, 2006 at 10:04:03AM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote: > On Sun, Aug 20, 2006 at 04:23:46AM +0400, Solar Designer wrote: > > The attached patch actually defines ecb_encrypt_iv() and > > ecb_decrypt_iv() functions that perform ECB encryption/decryption > > ignoring the IV, yet return -ENOSYS (just like nocrypt_iv would). > > The result is no more Oopses and no infoleaks either. > > Can the cryptoloop patch use CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CFB or CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CTR > and so be redirected to nocrypt() which will leave uninitialized memory > too ? At least patch-cryptoloop-jari-2.4.22.0 in particular will only do CBC (default, preferred) or ECB (if requested); it won't attempt to use CFB or CTR. Regarding nocrypt*(): > I wonder whether we shouldn't consider that those functions must at > least clear the memory area that was submitted to them, such as > proposed below. It would also fix the problem for potential other > users. This makes sense to me, although it is not perfect as Herbert has correctly pointed out: > If the user is ignoring the error value here then you're in serious > trouble anyway since they've just lost all their data. Can we maybe define working but IV-ignoring functions for ECB (like I did), but use memory-clearing nocrypt*() for CFB and CTR (as long as these are not supported)? Of course, all of these will return -ENOSYS. Alexander - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
