Laurent Vivier <laurent@xxxxxxxxx> writes: > On 01/11/2018 04:51, Jann Horn wrote: >> On Thu, Nov 1, 2018 at 3:59 AM James Bottomley >> <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> >>> On Tue, 2018-10-16 at 11:52 +0200, Laurent Vivier wrote: >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> Any comment on this last version? >>>> >>>> Any chance to be merged? >>> >>> I've got a use case for this: I went to one of the Graphene talks in >>> Edinburgh and it struck me that we seem to keep reinventing the type of >>> sandboxing that qemu-user already does. However if you want to do an >>> x86 on x86 sandbox, you can't currently use the binfmt_misc mechanism >>> because that has you running *every* binary on the system emulated. >>> Doing it per user namespace fixes this problem and allows us to at >>> least cut down on all the pointless duplication. >> >> Waaaaaait. What? qemu-user does not do "sandboxing". qemu-user makes >> your code slower and *LESS* secure. As far as I know, qemu-user is >> only intended for purposes like development and testing. >> > > I think the idea here is not to run qemu, but to use an interpreter > (something like gVisor) into a container to control the binaries > execution inside the container without using this interpreter on the > host itself (container and host shares the same binfmt_misc > magic/mask). Please remind me of this patchset after the merge window is over, and if there are no issues I will take it via my user namespace branch. Last I looked I had a concern that some of the permission check issues were being papered over by using override cred instead of fixing the deaper code. Sometimes they are necessary but seeing work-arounds instead of fixes for problems tends to be a maintenance issue, possibly with security consequences. Best is if the everyone agrees on how all of the interfaces work so their are no surprises. Eric _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
