On 12/07/2013 06:00 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Gao feng (gaofeng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx):
>> 1, remove the permission check of pid namespace. it's no reason
>> to deny un-init pid namespace to operate audit subsystem.
>>
>> 2, only allow init user namespace and init audit namespace to
>> operate list/add/del rule, tty set, trim, make equiv operations.
>>
>> 3, allow audit namespace to get/set audit configuration, send
>> userspace audit message.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> kernel/audit.c | 13 ++++++-------
>> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>> index 095f54d..c4d4291 100644
>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>> @@ -573,11 +573,7 @@ out:
>> static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
>> {
>> int err = 0;
>> -
>> - /* Only support the initial namespaces for now. */
>> - if ((current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) ||
>> - (task_active_pid_ns(current) != &init_pid_ns))
>> - return -EPERM;
>> + struct audit_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->audit_ns;
>>
>> switch (msg_type) {
>> case AUDIT_LIST:
>> @@ -586,6 +582,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> case AUDIT_GET:
>> case AUDIT_SET:
>> + break;
>
> So, these AUDIT_SET and AUDIT_GET go from requiring CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL
> to not needing any privs at all?
>
My mistake, there should be a check such as
ns_capable(ns, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL).
will fix in next version.
Thanks!
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