Quoting Gao feng (gaofeng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> 1, remove the permission check of pid namespace. it's no reason
> to deny un-init pid namespace to operate audit subsystem.
>
> 2, only allow init user namespace and init audit namespace to
> operate list/add/del rule, tty set, trim, make equiv operations.
>
> 3, allow audit namespace to get/set audit configuration, send
> userspace audit message.
>
> Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 13 ++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 095f54d..c4d4291 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -573,11 +573,7 @@ out:
> static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
> {
> int err = 0;
> -
> - /* Only support the initial namespaces for now. */
> - if ((current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) ||
> - (task_active_pid_ns(current) != &init_pid_ns))
> - return -EPERM;
> + struct audit_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->audit_ns;
>
> switch (msg_type) {
> case AUDIT_LIST:
> @@ -586,6 +582,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> case AUDIT_GET:
> case AUDIT_SET:
> + break;
So, these AUDIT_SET and AUDIT_GET go from requiring CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL
to not needing any privs at all?
> case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
> case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
> case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
> @@ -594,13 +591,15 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
> case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
> case AUDIT_TRIM:
> case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
> - if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
> + if ((current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) ||
> + (ns != &init_audit_ns) ||
> + !capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
> err = -EPERM;
> break;
> case AUDIT_USER:
> case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
> case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
> - if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
> + if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
> err = -EPERM;
> break;
> default: /* bad msg */
> --
> 1.8.3.1
>
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