Jan Kaluza <jkaluza@xxxxxxxxxx> writes: > Hi, > > this patchset against net-next (applies also to linux-next) adds 3 new types > of "Socket"-level control message (SCM_AUDIT, SCM_PROCINFO and SCM_CGROUP). > > Server-like processes in many cases need credentials and other > metadata of the peer, to decide if the calling process is allowed to > request a specific action, or the server just wants to log away this > type of information for auditing tasks. > > The current practice to retrieve such process metadata is to look that > information up in procfs with the $PID received over SCM_CREDENTIALS. > This is sufficient for long-running tasks, but introduces a race which > cannot be worked around for short-living processes; the calling > process and all the information in /proc/$PID/ is gone before the > receiver of the socket message can look it up. > Changes introduced in this patchset can also increase performance > of such server-like processes, because current way of opening and > parsing /proc/$PID/* files is much more expensive than receiving these > metadata using SCM. Can I just say ick, blech, barf, gag. You don't require this information to be passed. You are asking people to suport a lot of new code for the forseeable future. The only advantage appears to be for short lived racy processes that don't even bother to make certain their message was acknowleged before exiting. You sent this during the merge window which is the time for code integration and testing not new code. By my count you have overflowed cb in struct sk_buff and are stomping on _skb_refdest. If you are going to go crazy and pass things is there a reason you do not add a patch to pass the bsd SCM_CREDS? That information seems more relevant in a security context and for making security decisions than about half the information you are passing. Eric _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
