On 01/26/2013 06:22 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > In the help text describing user namespaces recommend use of memory > control groups. In many cases memory control groups are the only > mechanism there is to limit how much memory a user who can create > user namespaces can use. > > Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > Documentation/namespaces/resource-control.txt | 10 ++++++++++ > init/Kconfig | 7 +++++++ > 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 Documentation/namespaces/resource-control.txt > > diff --git a/Documentation/namespaces/resource-control.txt b/Documentation/namespaces/resource-control.txt > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..3d8178a > --- /dev/null > +++ b/Documentation/namespaces/resource-control.txt > @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ > +There are a lot of kinds of objects in the kernel that don't have > +individual limits or that have limits that are ineffective when a set > +of processes is allowed to switch user ids. With user namespaces > +enabled in a kernel for people who don't trust their users or their > +users programs to play nice this problems becomes more acute. > + > +Therefore it is recommended that memory control groups be enabled in > +kernels that enable user namespaces, and it is further recommended > +that userspace configure memory control groups to limit how much > +memory users they don't trust to play nice can use. > diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig > index 7d30240..c8c58bd 100644 > --- a/init/Kconfig > +++ b/init/Kconfig > @@ -1035,6 +1035,13 @@ config USER_NS > help > This allows containers, i.e. vservers, to use user namespaces > to provide different user info for different servers. > + > + When user namespaces are enabled in the kernel it is > + recommended that the MEMCG and MEMCG_KMEM options also be > + enabled and that user-space use the memory control groups to > + limit the amount of memory a memory unprivileged users can > + use. > + > If unsure, say N. Since this becomes an official recommendation that people will likely follow, are we really that much concerned about the types of abuses the MEMCG_KMEM will prevent? Those are mostly metadata-based abuses users could do in their own local disks without mounting anything extra (and things that look like that) Unless there is a specific concern here, shouldn't we say "... that the MEMCG (and possibly MEMCG_KMEM) options..." ? _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
