The HCI_OP_READ_ENC_KEY_SIZE command is converted from using the
deprecated hci_request mechanism to use hci_send_cmd, with an
accompanying hci_cc_read_enc_key_size to handle it's return response.
Signed-off-by: Brian Gix <brian.gix@xxxxxxxxx>
---
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 938abe6352bf..a0c3583b29bb 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -712,6 +712,47 @@ static u8 hci_cc_read_local_version(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
return rp->status;
}
+static u8 hci_cc_read_enc_key_size(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct hci_rp_read_enc_key_size *rp = data;
+ struct hci_conn *conn;
+ u16 handle;
+ u8 status = rp->status;
+
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "status 0x%2.2x", status);
+
+ handle = le16_to_cpu(rp->handle);
+
+ hci_dev_lock(hdev);
+
+ conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, handle);
+ if (!conn) {
+ status = 0xFF;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* While unexpected, the read_enc_key_size command may fail. The most
+ * secure approach is to then assume the key size is 0 to force a
+ * disconnection.
+ */
+ if (status) {
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to read key size for handle %u",
+ handle);
+ conn->enc_key_size = 0;
+ } else {
+ conn->enc_key_size = rp->key_size;
+ status = 0;
+ }
+
+ hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, 0);
+
+done:
+ hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+
+ return status;
+}
+
static u8 hci_cc_read_local_commands(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
@@ -3534,47 +3575,6 @@ static void hci_remote_name_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
}
-static void read_enc_key_size_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status,
- u16 opcode, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- const struct hci_rp_read_enc_key_size *rp;
- struct hci_conn *conn;
- u16 handle;
-
- BT_DBG("%s status 0x%02x", hdev->name, status);
-
- if (!skb || skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) {
- bt_dev_err(hdev, "invalid read key size response");
- return;
- }
-
- rp = (void *)skb->data;
- handle = le16_to_cpu(rp->handle);
-
- hci_dev_lock(hdev);
-
- conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, handle);
- if (!conn)
- goto unlock;
-
- /* While unexpected, the read_enc_key_size command may fail. The most
- * secure approach is to then assume the key size is 0 to force a
- * disconnection.
- */
- if (rp->status) {
- bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to read key size for handle %u",
- handle);
- conn->enc_key_size = 0;
- } else {
- conn->enc_key_size = rp->key_size;
- }
-
- hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, 0);
-
-unlock:
- hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
-}
-
static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
@@ -3639,7 +3639,6 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
/* Try reading the encryption key size for encrypted ACL links */
if (!ev->status && ev->encrypt && conn->type == ACL_LINK) {
struct hci_cp_read_enc_key_size cp;
- struct hci_request req;
/* Only send HCI_Read_Encryption_Key_Size if the
* controller really supports it. If it doesn't, assume
@@ -3650,12 +3649,9 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
goto notify;
}
- hci_req_init(&req, hdev);
-
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
- hci_req_add(&req, HCI_OP_READ_ENC_KEY_SIZE, sizeof(cp), &cp);
-
- if (hci_req_run_skb(&req, read_enc_key_size_complete)) {
+ if (hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_READ_ENC_KEY_SIZE,
+ sizeof(cp), &cp)) {
bt_dev_err(hdev, "sending read key size failed");
conn->enc_key_size = HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE;
goto notify;
@@ -4037,6 +4033,8 @@ static const struct hci_cc {
sizeof(struct hci_rp_read_local_amp_info)),
HCI_CC(HCI_OP_READ_CLOCK, hci_cc_read_clock,
sizeof(struct hci_rp_read_clock)),
+ HCI_CC(HCI_OP_READ_ENC_KEY_SIZE, hci_cc_read_enc_key_size,
+ sizeof(struct hci_rp_read_enc_key_size)),
HCI_CC(HCI_OP_READ_INQ_RSP_TX_POWER, hci_cc_read_inq_rsp_tx_power,
sizeof(struct hci_rp_read_inq_rsp_tx_power)),
HCI_CC(HCI_OP_READ_DEF_ERR_DATA_REPORTING,
--
2.37.1
