Hi,
On 1/6/22 05:00, Catalin Marinas wrote:
Hi Jeremy,
On Wed, Jan 05, 2022 at 04:42:01PM -0600, Jeremy Linton wrote:
On 1/4/22 11:32, Mark Brown wrote:
On Thu, Dec 09, 2021 at 11:10:48AM +0000, Szabolcs Nagy wrote:
The 12/08/2021 18:23, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Mon, Nov 15, 2021 at 03:27:10PM +0000, Mark Brown wrote:
memory is already mapped with PROT_EXEC. This series resolves this by
handling the BTI property for both the interpreter and the main
executable.
Given the silence on this series over the past months, I propose we drop
it. It's a bit unfortunate that systemd's MemoryDenyWriteExecute cannot
work with BTI but I also think the former is a pretty blunt hardening
mechanism (rejecting any mprotect(PROT_EXEC) regardless of the previous
attributes).
i still think it would be better if the kernel dealt with
PROT_BTI for the exe loaded by the kernel.
The above message from Catalin isn't quite the full story here - my
understanding from backchannel is that there's concern from others that
we might be creating future issues by enabling PROT_BTI, especially in
the case where the same permissions issue prevents the dynamic linker
disabling PROT_BTI. They'd therefore rather stick with the status quo
and not create any new ABI. Unfortunately that's not something people
have been willing to say on the list, hopefully the above captures the
thinking well enough.
Personally I'm a bit ambivalent on this, I do see the potential issue
but I'm having trouble constructing an actual scenario and my instinct
is that since we handle PROT_EXEC we should also handle PROT_BTI for
consistency.
I'm hardly a security expert, but it seems to me that BTI hardens against a
wider set of possible exploits than MDWE.
They are complementary features.
Yet, we are silently turning it
off for systemd services which are considered some of the most security
critical things in the machine right now (ex:logind, etc). So despite
'systemd-analyze secuirty` flagging those services as the most secure ones
on a system, they might actually be less secure.
Well, that's a distro decision. MDWE/MDWX is not something imposed by
the kernel but rather a seccomp bpf filter set up by systemd.
It also seems that getting BTI turned on earlier, as this patch is doing is
itself a win.
So, mentally i'm having a hard time balancing the hypothetical problem laid
out, as it should only really exist in an environment similar to the MDWE
one, since AFAIK, its possible today to just flip it back off unless MDWE
stops that from happening.
That's a user ABI change and given that the first attempt was shown to
break with some combination of old loader and new main executable (or
the other way around), I'd rather keep things as they are.
This should only change the behavior for for binaries which conform to
the new ABI containing the BTI note. So outside of the tiny window of
things built with BTI, but run on !BTI hardware or older kernel+glibc,
this shouldn't be a problem. (Unless i'm missing something) Put another
way, now is the time to make a change, before there is a legacy BTI
ecosystem we have to deal with.
What are the the remaining alternatives? A new syscall? But that is by
definition a new ABI,
A new ABI is better than changing the current ABI.
and wouldn't benefit from having BTI turned on as early as this patch
is doing.
In the absence of MDWX, it's not relevant how early the kernel turns BTI
on for the main executable. The dynamic loader would do this with an
mprotect() before actually executing any of the main code. Of course, we
assume there are no security bugs in the dynamic loader.
Should we disable MDWE on a BTI machine? I'm
not sure that is a good look, particularly if MDWE happens to successfully
stop some exploit. AFAIK, MDWE+BTI are a good strong combination, it seems a
shame if we can't get them both working together.
AFAICT MDWX wants (one of the filters) to prevent a previously writable
mapping from becoming executable through mprotect(PROT_EXEC). How common
is mprotect(PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI) outside of the dynamic loader? I doubt
it is, especially in an MDWX environment. So can we not change the
filter to allow PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI? If your code is already exploitable
to allow random syscalls, all bets are off anyway.
I would expect JITs to be twittling EXEC|BTI but, those wouldn't be able
to trivially run under MDWE anyway. So rarely?
Changing the filter to allow PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI defeats the purpose
because the hypothetical exploit would just add the BTI tags and turn
BTI on as well. The filter, as is, also provides additional BTI
protections because it makes it more difficult to disable BTI. Without
that filter it seems likely someone could come up with a way to use an
existing PROT_EXEC as a gadget to disable BTI anywhere they choose.
So, to your point before, BTI+MDWE are complementary, the combination
seems considerably more robust than either by itself.
I hesitate to suggest it, but maybe this patch should be conditional
somehow, that way !systemd/MDWE machines can behave as they do today, and
systemd/MDWE machines can request BTI be turned on by the kernel
automatically?
That would be some big knob sysctl but I'm still not keen on toggling
the ABI like this.
