On Thu, Dec 09, 2021 at 11:10:48AM +0000, Szabolcs Nagy wrote: > The 12/08/2021 18:23, Catalin Marinas wrote: > > On Mon, Nov 15, 2021 at 03:27:10PM +0000, Mark Brown wrote: > > > memory is already mapped with PROT_EXEC. This series resolves this by > > > handling the BTI property for both the interpreter and the main > > > executable. > > Given the silence on this series over the past months, I propose we drop > > it. It's a bit unfortunate that systemd's MemoryDenyWriteExecute cannot > > work with BTI but I also think the former is a pretty blunt hardening > > mechanism (rejecting any mprotect(PROT_EXEC) regardless of the previous > > attributes). > i still think it would be better if the kernel dealt with > PROT_BTI for the exe loaded by the kernel. The above message from Catalin isn't quite the full story here - my understanding from backchannel is that there's concern from others that we might be creating future issues by enabling PROT_BTI, especially in the case where the same permissions issue prevents the dynamic linker disabling PROT_BTI. They'd therefore rather stick with the status quo and not create any new ABI. Unfortunately that's not something people have been willing to say on the list, hopefully the above captures the thinking well enough. Personally I'm a bit ambivalent on this, I do see the potential issue but I'm having trouble constructing an actual scenario and my instinct is that since we handle PROT_EXEC we should also handle PROT_BTI for consistency.
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