On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 9:39 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > If you don't have secure boot then an attacker with root can modify your > > bootloader or kernel, and on next boot lockdown can be silently disabled. > This has been rebutted over and over and over. Secure boot is not the > only verified boot mechanism in the world. Other, better, much more > auditable, and much simpler mechanisms have been around for a long, > long time. Right and if you *know* that you're in that situation then you either turn it on in bootparams from the verified bootloader (which we can't do in UEFI because the *firmware* can be the bootloader thanks to the EFI boot stub) or you enable it from userland later (I can't remember if this version of the patchset provides that functionality, but a previous one did). > > Which is why Shim allows you to disable validation if you prove physical > > user presence. > And that's a giant hack. The actual feature should be that a user > proves physical presence and thus disables lockdown *without* > disabling verification. That's a completely reasonable feature request. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
