On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 at 6:40 AM, Tycho Andersen
<tycho.andersen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 05, 2015 at 09:13:02AM +0200, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
>> On 09/04/2015 10:41 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 9:04 AM, Tycho Andersen
>> > <tycho.andersen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> >> This is the final bit needed to support seccomp filters created via the bpf
>> >> syscall.
>>
>> Hmm. Thanks Kees, for CCinf linux-api@. That really should have been done at
>> the outset.
>
> Apologies, I'll cc the list on future versions.
>
>> Tycho, where's the man-pages patch describing this new kernel-userspace
>> API feature? :-)
>
> Once we get the API finalized I'm happy to write it.
>
>> >> One concern with this patch is exactly what the interface should look like
>> >> for users, since seccomp()'s second argument is a pointer, we could ask
>> >> people to pass a pointer to the fd, but implies we might write to it which
>> >> seems impolite. Right now we cast the pointer (and force the user to cast
>> >> it), which generates ugly warnings. I'm not sure what the right answer is
>> >> here.
>> >>
>> >> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> >> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> >> CC: Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> >> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> >> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> >> CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> >> CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> >> CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> >> CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> >> ---
>> >> include/linux/seccomp.h | 3 +-
>> >> include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 1 +
>> >> kernel/seccomp.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>> >> 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>> >>
>> >> diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
>> >> index d1a86ed..a725dd5 100644
>> >> --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
>> >> +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
>> >> @@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
>> >>
>> >> #include <uapi/linux/seccomp.h>
>> >>
>> >> -#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK (SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
>> >> +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK (\
>> >> + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC | SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_EBPF)
>> >>
>> >> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
>> >>
>> >> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>> >> index 0f238a4..c29a423 100644
>> >> --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>> >> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>> >> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
>> >>
>> >> /* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
>> >> #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
>> >> +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_EBPF (1 << 1)
>> >>
>> >> /*
>> >> * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
>> >> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> >> index a2c5b32..9c6bea6 100644
>> >> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
>> >> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> >> @@ -355,17 +355,6 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
>> >>
>> >> BUG_ON(INT_MAX / fprog->len < sizeof(struct sock_filter));
>> >>
>> >> - /*
>> >> - * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has
>> >> - * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
>> >> - * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
>> >> - * behavior of privileged children.
>> >> - */
>> >> - if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
>> >> - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
>> >> - CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
>> >> - return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
>> >> -
>> >> /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
>> >> sfilter = kzalloc(sizeof(*sfilter), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
>> >> if (!sfilter)
>> >> @@ -509,6 +498,48 @@ static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
>> >> info.si_syscall = syscall;
>> >> force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current);
>> >> }
>> >> +
>> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
>> >> +static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_ebpf(const char __user *filter)
>> >> +{
>> >> + /* XXX: this cast generates a warning. should we make people pass in
>> >> + * &fd, or is there some nicer way of doing this?
>> >> + */
>> >> + u32 fd = (u32) filter;
>> >
>> > I think this is probably the right way to do it, modulo getting the
>> > warning fixed. Let me invoke the great linux-api subscribers to get
>> > some more opinions.
>>
>> Sigh. It's sad, but the using a cast does seem the simplest option.
>> But, how about another idea...
>>
>> > tl;dr: adding SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_EBPF to the flags changes the
>> > pointer argument into an fd argument. Is this sane, should it be a
>> > pointer to an fd, or should it not be a flag at all, creating a new
>> > seccomp command instead (SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER_EBPF)?
>>
>> What about
>>
>> seccomp(SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER_EBPF, flags, structp)
>>
>> Where structp is a pointer to something like
>>
>> struct seccomp_ebpf {
>> int size; /* Size of this whole struct */
>> int fd;
>> }
>>
>> 'size' allows for future expansion of the struct (in case we want to
>> expand it later), and placing 'fd' inside a struct avoids unpleasant
>> implication that would be made by passing a pointer to an fd as the
>> third argument.
>
> I like this; although perhaps something like bpf() has, with the
> unions inside the struct so that we don't have to declare another
> struct if we add another seccomp command. Kees?
Yeah, bpf's union looks good. Let's add a "command" flag, though:
seccomp(SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER_EBPF, int cmd, union, size);
And this cmd could be ADD_FD or something?
How's that look?
-Kees
>
> Tycho
>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Michael
>>
>>
>> > -Kees
>> >
>> >> + struct seccomp_filter *ret;
>> >> + struct bpf_prog *prog;
>> >> +
>> >> + prog = bpf_prog_get(fd);
>> >> + if (IS_ERR(prog))
>> >> + return (struct seccomp_filter *) prog;
>> >> +
>> >> + if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP) {
>> >> + bpf_prog_put(prog);
>> >> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>> >> + }
>> >> +
>> >> + ret = kzalloc(sizeof(*ret), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
>> >> + if (!ret) {
>> >> + bpf_prog_put(prog);
>> >> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>> >> + }
>> >> +
>> >> + ret->prog = prog;
>> >> + atomic_set(&ret->usage, 1);
>> >> +
>> >> + /* Intentionally don't bpf_prog_put() here, because the underlying prog
>> >> + * is refcounted too and we're holding a reference from the struct
>> >> + * seccomp_filter object.
>> >> + */
>> >> +
>> >> + return ret;
>> >> +}
>> >> +#else
>> >> +static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_ebpf(const char __user *filter)
>> >> +{
>> >> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>> >> +}
>> >> +#endif
>> >> #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
>> >>
>> >> /*
>> >> @@ -775,8 +806,23 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
>> >> if (flags & ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK)
>> >> return -EINVAL;
>> >>
>> >> + /*
>> >> + * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has
>> >> + * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
>> >> + * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
>> >> + * behavior of privileged children.
>> >> + */
>> >> + if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
>> >> + security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
>> >> + CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
>> >> + return -EACCES;
>> >> +
>> >> /* Prepare the new filter before holding any locks. */
>> >> - prepared = seccomp_prepare_user_filter(filter);
>> >> + if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_EBPF)
>> >> + prepared = seccomp_prepare_ebpf(filter);
>> >> + else
>> >> + prepared = seccomp_prepare_user_filter(filter);
>> >> +
>> >> if (IS_ERR(prepared))
>> >> return PTR_ERR(prepared);
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> 2.1.4
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>> --
>> Michael Kerrisk
>> Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
>> Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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