On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 5:49 PM, Tycho Andersen
<tycho.andersen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> This patch is the first step in enabling checkpoint/restore of processes
> with seccomp enabled.
>
> One of the things CRIU does while dumping tasks is inject code into them
> via ptrace to collect information that is only available to the process
> itself. However, if we are in a seccomp mode where these processes are
> prohibited from making these syscalls, then what CRIU does kills the task.
>
> This patch adds a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP, that enables
> a task from the init user namespace which has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and no seccomp
> filters to disable (and re-enable) seccomp filters for another task so that
> they can be successfully dumped (and restored). We restrict the set of
> processes that can disable seccomp through ptrace because although today
> ptrace can be used to bypass seccomp, there is some discussion of closing
> this loophole in the future and we would like this patch to not depend on
> that behavior and be future proofed for when it is removed.
>
> Note that seccomp can be suspended before any filters are actually
> installed; this behavior is useful on criu restore, so that we can suspend
> seccomp, restore the filters, unmap our restore code from the restored
> process' address space, and then resume the task by detaching and have the
> filters resumed as well.
>
> v2 changes:
>
> * require that the tracer have no seccomp filters installed
> * drop TIF_NOTSC manipulation from the patch
> * change from ptrace command to a ptrace option and use this ptrace option
> as the flag to check. This means that as soon as the tracer
> detaches/dies, seccomp is re-enabled and as a corrollary that one can not
> disable seccomp across PTRACE_ATTACHs.
>
> v3 changes:
>
> * get rid of various #ifdefs everywhere
> * report more sensible errors when PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is incorrectly
> used
>
> v4 changes:
>
> * get rid of may_suspend_seccomp() in favor of a capable() check in ptrace
> directly
>
> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Roland McGrath <roland@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> include/linux/ptrace.h | 1 +
> include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h | 6 ++++--
> kernel/ptrace.c | 9 +++++++++
> kernel/seccomp.c | 8 ++++++++
> 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
> index 987a73a..061265f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
> #define PT_TRACE_SECCOMP PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
>
> #define PT_EXITKILL (PTRACE_O_EXITKILL << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT)
> +#define PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT)
>
> /* single stepping state bits (used on ARM and PA-RISC) */
> #define PT_SINGLESTEP_BIT 31
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
> index cf1019e..a7a6979 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
> @@ -89,9 +89,11 @@ struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args {
> #define PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP (1 << PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
>
> /* eventless options */
> -#define PTRACE_O_EXITKILL (1 << 20)
> +#define PTRACE_O_EXITKILL (1 << 20)
> +#define PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (1 << 21)
>
> -#define PTRACE_O_MASK (0x000000ff | PTRACE_O_EXITKILL)
> +#define PTRACE_O_MASK (\
> + 0x000000ff | PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)
>
> #include <asm/ptrace.h>
>
> diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
> index c8e0e05..11fa460 100644
> --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -556,6 +556,15 @@ static int ptrace_setoptions(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long data)
> if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) {
> + if (!config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
> + !config_enabled(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> +
> /* Avoid intermediate state when all opts are cleared */
> flags = child->ptrace;
> flags &= ~(PTRACE_O_MASK << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT);
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 980fd26..645e42d 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -590,6 +590,10 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
> {
> int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
>
> + if (config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
> + unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
> + return;
> +
> if (mode == 0)
> return;
> else if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT)
> @@ -691,6 +695,10 @@ u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd)
> int this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
> syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current));
>
> + if (config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
> + unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
> + return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK;
> +
> switch (mode) {
> case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
> __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); /* may call do_exit */
> --
> 2.1.4
>
And if I've convinced Andy to be okay with this patch, consider v4:
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
