On Wed, Jun 10, 2015 at 10:29 AM, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Quoting Andy Lutomirski (luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx):
>> On Wed, Jun 10, 2015 at 9:31 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> > On 06/09, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 5:49 PM, Tycho Andersen
>> >> >
>> >> > @@ -556,6 +556,15 @@ static int ptrace_setoptions(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long data)
>> >> > if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
>> >> > return -EINVAL;
>> >> >
>> >> > + if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) {
>> >
>> > Well, we should do this if
>> >
>> > (data & O_SUSPEND) && !(flags & O_SUSPEND)
>> >
>> > or at least if
>> >
>> > (data ^ flags) & O_SUSPEND
>> >
>> >
>> >> > + if (!config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
>> >> > + !config_enabled(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
>> >> > + return -EINVAL;
>> >> > +
>> >> > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> >> > + return -EPERM;
>> >>
>> >> I tend to think that we should also require that current not be using
>> >> seccomp. Otherwise, in principle, there's a seccomp bypass for
>> >> privileged-but-seccomped programs.
>> >
>> > Andy, I simply can't understand why do we need any security check at all.
>> >
>> > OK, yes, in theory we can have a seccomped CAP_SYS_ADMIN process, seccomp
>> > doesn't filter ptrace, you hack that process and force it to attach to
>> > another CAP_SYS_ADMIN/seccomped process, etc, etc... Looks too paranoid
>> > to me.
>>
>> I've sometimes considered having privileged processes I write fork and
>> seccomp their child. Of course, if you're allowing ptrace through
>> your seccomp filter, you open a giant can of worms, but I think we
>> should take the more paranoid approach to start and relax it later as
>
> I really do intend to look at your old proposed tree for improving that...
> have only done a once-over so far, though.
Don't read it yet. It's unnecessarily complicated due to the mess
that is x86's entry code, and I want to clean up the entry code first.
--Andy
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
