On Tue, Jun 02, 2015 at 10:02:10PM +0300, Pavel Emelyanov wrote:
>
> >> +int suspend_seccomp(struct task_struct *task)
> >> +{
> >> + int ret = -EACCES;
> >> +
> >> + spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
> >> +
> >> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> >> + goto out;
> >
> > I am puzzled ;) Why do we need ->siglock? And even if we need it, why
> > we can't check CAP_SYS_ADMIN lockless?
> >
> > And I am not sure I understand why do we need the additional security
> > check, but I leave this to you and Andy.
> >
> > If you have the rights to trace this task, then you can do anything
> > the tracee could do without the filtering.
>
> I think _this_ check is required, otherwise the seccomp-ed task (in
> filtered mode) fork-s a child, then this child ptrace-attach to parent
> (allowed) then suspend its seccomd. And -- we have unpriviledged process
> de-seccomped.
If you can ptrace(), you can already escape from seccomp. See this
section in man 2 seccomp, in the SECCOMP_RET_TRACE section:
The seccomp check will not be run again after the tracer is
notified. (This means that seccomp-based sandboxes must not
allow use of ptrace(2)—even of other sandboxed processes—
without extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to
escape from the seccomp sandbox.)
(But I think there have been discussions about changing that behavior in
the future?)
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