On 21-02-08 17:03:25, Dan Williams wrote: > On Mon, Feb 8, 2021 at 3:36 PM Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Mon, Feb 8, 2021 at 2:09 PM Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, Feb 08, 2021 at 02:00:33PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > > > > [ add Jon Corbet as I'd expect him to be Cc'd on anything that > > > > generically touches Documentation/ like this, and add Kees as the last > > > > person who added a taint (tag you're it) ] > > > > > > > > Jon, Kees, are either of you willing to ack this concept? > > > > > > > > Top-posting to add more context for the below: > > > > > > > > This taint is proposed because it has implications for > > > > CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL among other things. These CXL devices > > > > implement memory like DDR would, but unlike DDR there are > > > > administrative / configuration commands that demand kernel > > > > coordination before they can be sent. The posture taken with this > > > > taint is "guilty until proven innocent" for commands that have yet to > > > > be explicitly allowed by the driver. This is different than NVME for > > > > example where an errant vendor-defined command could destroy data on > > > > the device, but there is no wider threat to system integrity. The > > > > taint allows a pressure release valve for any and all commands to be > > > > sent, but flagged with WARN_TAINT_ONCE if the driver has not > > > > explicitly enabled it on an allowed list of known-good / kernel > > > > coordinated commands. > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 4:25 PM Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > For drivers that moderate access to the underlying hardware it is > > > > > sometimes desirable to allow userspace to bypass restrictions. Once > > > > > userspace has done this, the driver can no longer guarantee the sanctity > > > > > of either the OS or the hardware. When in this state, it is helpful for > > > > > kernel developers to be made aware (via this taint flag) of this fact > > > > > for subsequent bug reports. > > > > > > > > > > Example usage: > > > > > - Hardware xyzzy accepts 2 commands, waldo and fred. > > > > > - The xyzzy driver provides an interface for using waldo, but not fred. > > > > > - quux is convinced they really need the fred command. > > > > > - xyzzy driver allows quux to frob hardware to initiate fred. > > > > > - kernel gets tainted. > > > > > - turns out fred command is borked, and scribbles over memory. > > > > > - developers laugh while closing quux's subsequent bug report. > > > > > > But a taint flag only lasts for the current boot. If this is a drive, it > > > could still be compromised after reboot. It sounds like this taint is > > > really only for ephemeral things? "vendor shenanigans" is a pretty giant > > > scope ... > > > > > > > That is true. This is more about preventing an ecosystem / cottage > > industry of tooling built around bypassing the kernel. So the kernel > > complains loudly and hopefully prevents vendor tooling from > > propagating and instead directs that development effort back to the > > native tooling. However for the rare "I know what I'm doing" cases, > > this tainted kernel bypass lets some experimentation and debug happen, > > but the kernel is transparent that when the capability ships in > > production it needs to be a native implementation. > > > > So it's less, "the system integrity is compromised" and more like > > "you're bypassing the development process that ensures sanity for CXL > > implementations that may take down a system if implemented > > incorrectly". For example, NVME reset is a non-invent, CXL reset can > > be like surprise removing DDR DIMM. > > > > Should this be more tightly scoped to CXL? I had hoped to use this in > > other places in LIBNVDIMM, but I'm ok to lose some generality for the > > specific concerns that make CXL devices different than other PCI > > endpoints. > > As I type this out it strikes me that plain WARN already does > TAINT_WARN and meets the spirit of what is trying to be achieved. > > Appreciate the skeptical eye Kees, we'll drop this one. So I think this is a good compromise for now. However, the point of this taint was that it is specifically called out what tainted the kernel. It'd be great to know when we have a bug report it was this specifically that was the issue. Rambling further I realize now that taint doesn't tell you which module tainted, which would be great here. That's actually what I'd like. End ramble.
