On Thu, Nov 10, 2011 at 9:57 AM, Markus Armbruster <armbru@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> 3) The block probing code replicates a well known CVE from three
>>> years ago[1]. Using kvm-tool, a malicious guest could write the
>>> qcow2 signature to the zero sector and use that to attack the host.
>>
>> We don't support QCOW2 snapshots so I don't see how the "arbitrary
>> file" thing can happen.
>
> You don't need snapshots for the hole.
>
> Start with a clean read/write raw image. Probing declares it raw.
> Guest writes QCOW signature to it, with a backing file of its choice.
>
> Restart with the same image. Probing declares it QCOW2. Guest can read
> the backing file. Oops.
>
> Probing images works when all image types can be probed reliably, and
> the guest can't mess with the probing. Requires distinctive signatures
> the guest can't change. Raw images spoil it.
We don't support that "backing file" thing either. ;-)
On Thu, Nov 10, 2011 at 9:57 AM, Markus Armbruster <armbru@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> It's pretty sad though that we're replicating a known security issue :-/
>
> Maybe I'm wrong, but I got the impression you've been replicating quite
> a few of QEMU's early mistakes.
>
> I hope you can create something better than QEMU, I really, really do.
> But to successfully build a second system, you need to learn the right
> lessons from the first system. Are you sure you do?
We do but it's a fair question if we're doing it enough. I don't have
a simple answer to that.
Pekka
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