On Thu, Sep 15, 2011 at 05:53:02PM +0300, Sasha Levin wrote: [...] > The 'random xid' suggestion is listed merely as an example. > > The way I see it using a xid based on MAC instead of a random number is > safer since the odds for same MAC on the same network are pretty slim > since it would cause problems on other layers in the network. I would agree with you if the current code didn't use just the last 4 bytes of the MAC address. So clients could have completely different MAC addresses (as expected), have no problems communicating in the network, but share the same final 4 bytes in the MAC address and end up generating the same xid. Probably a hash function that used all bytes of the MAC address as input would work too, but using a random number seems to be good enough (and simpler, IMO). > > Whats the reason behind this patch? Whats wrong with current selection > of xid? I'm not sure what issue made Amos investigate the xid generation code, but the current selection of xid is wrong as it uses just the last 4 bytes of the MAC address. -- Eduardo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
