Re: [PATCH V2 02/12] KVM: x86: Allow the use of kvm_load_host_xsave_state() with guest_state_protected

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On 2/20/25 11:50, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
On 1/29/2025 5:58 PM, Adrian Hunter wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>

Allow the use of kvm_load_host_xsave_state() with
vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected == true. This will allow TDX to reuse
kvm_load_host_xsave_state() instead of creating its own version.

For consistency, amend kvm_load_guest_xsave_state() also.

Ensure that guest state that kvm_load_host_xsave_state() depends upon,
such as MSR_IA32_XSS, cannot be changed by user space, if
guest_state_protected.

[Adrian: wrote commit message]

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z2GiQS_RmYeHU09L@xxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@xxxxxxxxx>
---
TD vcpu enter/exit v2:
  - New patch
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c |  7 +++++--
  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     | 18 +++++++++++-------
  2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7640a84e554a..b4bcfe15ad5e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4253,7 +4253,9 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
          svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
      clgi();
-    kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
+
+    if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+        kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
      kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
@@ -4282,7 +4284,8 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
      if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NMI))
          kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_NMI);
-    kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
+    if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+        kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
      stgi();
      /* Any pending NMI will happen here */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index bbb6b7f40b3a..5cf9f023fd4b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1169,11 +1169,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lmsw);
  void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
  {
-    if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
-        return;
+    WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected);
      if (kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)) {
-
          if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != kvm_host.xcr0)
              xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, vcpu->arch.xcr0);
@@ -1192,13 +1190,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_load_guest_xsave_state);
  void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
  {
-    if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
-        return;
-
      if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
          ((vcpu->arch.xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU) ||
           kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE))) {
-        vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
+        if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+            vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();

this needs justification.

          if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vcpu->arch.host_pkru)
              wrpkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
      }


@@ -3916,6 +3912,10 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
          if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
              !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
              return 1;
+
+        if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+            return 1;
+

this and below change need to be a separate patch. So that we can discuss independently.

I see no reason to make MSR_IA32_XSS special than other MSRs. When guest_state_protected, most of the MSRs that aren't emulated by KVM are inaccessible by KVM.

I agree with Xiaoyao that this change is sensible but should be proposed separately for both SNP and TDX.

Allowing the use of kvm_load_host_xsave_state() is really ugly, especially since the corresponding code is so simple:

        if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKU) && vcpu->arch.pkru != 0)
                        wrpkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);

	if (kvm_host.xcr0 != kvm_tdx->xfam & kvm_caps.supported_xcr0)
		xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, kvm_host.xcr0);

	/*
	 * All TDX hosts support XSS; but even if they didn't, both
	 * arms of the comparison would be 0 and the wrmsrl would be
	 * skipped.
	 */
	if (kvm_host.xss != kvm_tdx->xfam & kvm_caps.supported_xss)
		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, kvm_host.xss);

This is really all that should be in patch 7. I'll test it and decide what to do.

Paolo

          /*
           * KVM supports exposing PT to the guest, but does not support
           * IA32_XSS[bit 8]. Guests have to use RDMSR/WRMSR rather than
@@ -4375,6 +4375,10 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
          if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
              !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
              return 1;
+
+        if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+            return 1;
+
          msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.ia32_xss;
          break;
      case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:







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