Re: [PATCH V2 02/12] KVM: x86: Allow the use of kvm_load_host_xsave_state() with guest_state_protected

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On 2/24/2025 7:38 PM, Adrian Hunter wrote:
On 20/02/25 12:50, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
On 1/29/2025 5:58 PM, Adrian Hunter wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>

Allow the use of kvm_load_host_xsave_state() with
vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected == true. This will allow TDX to reuse
kvm_load_host_xsave_state() instead of creating its own version.

For consistency, amend kvm_load_guest_xsave_state() also.

Ensure that guest state that kvm_load_host_xsave_state() depends upon,
such as MSR_IA32_XSS, cannot be changed by user space, if
guest_state_protected.

[Adrian: wrote commit message]

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z2GiQS_RmYeHU09L@xxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@xxxxxxxxx>
---
TD vcpu enter/exit v2:
   - New patch
---
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c |  7 +++++--
   arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     | 18 +++++++++++-------
   2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7640a84e554a..b4bcfe15ad5e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4253,7 +4253,9 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
           svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
         clgi();
-    kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
+
+    if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+        kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
         kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
   @@ -4282,7 +4284,8 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
       if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NMI))
           kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_NMI);
   -    kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
+    if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+        kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
       stgi();
         /* Any pending NMI will happen here */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index bbb6b7f40b3a..5cf9f023fd4b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1169,11 +1169,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lmsw);
     void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
   {
-    if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
-        return;
+    WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected);
         if (kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)) {
-
           if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != kvm_host.xcr0)
               xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, vcpu->arch.xcr0);
   @@ -1192,13 +1190,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_load_guest_xsave_state);
     void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
   {
-    if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
-        return;
-
       if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
           ((vcpu->arch.xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU) ||
            kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE))) {
-        vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
+        if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+            vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();

this needs justification.

It was proposed by Sean here:

	https://lore.kernel.org/all/Z2WZ091z8GmGjSbC@xxxxxxxxxx/

which is part of the email thread referenced by the "Link:" tag above

IMHO, this change needs to be put in patch 07, which is the better place to justify it.


           if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vcpu->arch.host_pkru)
               wrpkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
       }


@@ -3916,6 +3912,10 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
           if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
               !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
               return 1;
+
+        if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+            return 1;
+

this and below change need to be a separate patch. So that we can discuss independently.

I see no reason to make MSR_IA32_XSS special than other MSRs. When guest_state_protected, most of the MSRs that aren't emulated by KVM are inaccessible by KVM.

Yes, TDX will block access to MSR_IA32_XSS anyway because
tdx_has_emulated_msr() will return false for MSR_IA32_XSS.

However kvm_load_host_xsave_state() is not TDX-specific code and it
relies upon vcpu->arch.ia32_xss, so there is reason to block
access to it when vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected is true.

It is TDX specific logic that TDX requires vcpu->arch.ia32_xss unchanged since TDX is going to utilize kvm_load_host_xsave_state() to restore host xsave state and relies on vcpu->arch.ia32_xss to be always the value of XFAM & XSS_MASK.

So please put this change into the TDX specific patch with the clear justfication.


           /*
            * KVM supports exposing PT to the guest, but does not support
            * IA32_XSS[bit 8]. Guests have to use RDMSR/WRMSR rather than
@@ -4375,6 +4375,10 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
           if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
               !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
               return 1;
+
+        if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+            return 1;
+
           msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.ia32_xss;
           break;
       case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:







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