On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 10:32:27AM -0700, Jim Mattson wrote:
> AMD's initial implementation of IBPB did not clear the return address
> predictor. Beginning with Zen4, AMD's IBPB *does* clear the return
> address predictor. This behavior is enumerated by
> CPUID.80000008H:EBX.IBPB_RET[bit 30].
>
> Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET for use in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID,
> when determining cross-vendor capabilities.
>
> Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 ++-
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index cabd6b58e8ec..a222a24677d7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@
> #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
> #define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD ( 7*32+24) /* AMD SSBD implementation via LS_CFG MSR */
> #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25) /* "ibrs" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
> -#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* "ibpb" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier without RSB flush */
I see upstream
#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* "ibpb" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
Where does "without RSB flush" come from?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
