On 5/28/2024 10:01 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 5/23/24 14:18, Ravi Bangoria wrote:
>> From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@xxxxxxx>
>>
>> KVM currently allows userspace to read/write MSRs even after the VMSA is
>> encrypted. This can cause unintentional issues if MSR access has side-
>> effects. For ex, while migrating a guest, userspace could attempt to
>> migrate MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR and end up unintentionally disabling LBRV on
>> the target. Fix this by preventing access to those MSRs which are context
>> switched via the VMSA, once the VMSA is encrypted.
>>
>> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@xxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@xxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> index 3d0549ca246f..489b0183f37d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> @@ -2834,10 +2834,24 @@ static int svm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
>> return 0;
>> }
>> +static bool
>> +sev_es_prevent_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> +{
>> + return sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) &&
>> + vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected &&
>> + svm_msrpm_offset(msr_info->index) != MSR_INVALID &&
>> + !msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, msr_info->index);
>> +}
>> +
>> static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> {
>> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
>> + if (sev_es_prevent_msr_access(vcpu, msr_info)) {
>> + msr_info->data = 0;
>> + return 0;
>
> This should return -EINVAL, not 0. Likewise below in svm_set_msr().
Sure.
Thanks,
Ravi
