On 5/23/24 14:18, Ravi Bangoria wrote:
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@xxxxxxx>
KVM currently allows userspace to read/write MSRs even after the VMSA is
encrypted. This can cause unintentional issues if MSR access has side-
effects. For ex, while migrating a guest, userspace could attempt to
migrate MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR and end up unintentionally disabling LBRV on
the target. Fix this by preventing access to those MSRs which are context
switched via the VMSA, once the VMSA is encrypted.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@xxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 3d0549ca246f..489b0183f37d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -2834,10 +2834,24 @@ static int svm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
return 0;
}
+static bool
+sev_es_prevent_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+ return sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) &&
+ vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected &&
+ svm_msrpm_offset(msr_info->index) != MSR_INVALID &&
+ !msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, msr_info->index);
+}
+
static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ if (sev_es_prevent_msr_access(vcpu, msr_info)) {
+ msr_info->data = 0;
+ return 0;
This should return -EINVAL, not 0. Likewise below in svm_set_msr().
Paolo
+ }
+
switch (msr_info->index) {
case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
@@ -2988,6 +3002,10 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
u32 ecx = msr->index;
u64 data = msr->data;
+
+ if (sev_es_prevent_msr_access(vcpu, msr))
+ return 0;
+
switch (ecx) {
case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
