> > My understanding is that PL[0-2]_SSP are used only on transitions to the
> > corresponding privilege level from a *different* privilege level. That means
> > KVM should be able to utilize the user_return_msr framework to load the host
> > values. Though if Linux ever supports SSS, I'm guessing the core kernel will
> > have some sort of mechanism to defer loading MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP until an exit to
> > userspace, e.g. to avoid having to write PL0_SSP, which will presumably be
> > per-task, on every context switch.
> >
> > But note my original wording: **If that's necessary**
> >
> > If nothing in the host ever consumes those MSRs, i.e. if SSS is NOT enabled in
> > IA32_S_CET, then running host stuff with guest values should be ok. KVM only
> > needs to guarantee that it doesn't leak values between guests. But that should
> > Just Work, e.g. KVM should load the new vCPU's values if SHSTK is exposed to the
> > guest, and intercept (to inject #GP) if SHSTK is not exposed to the guest.
> >
> > And regardless of what the mechanism ends up managing SSP MSRs, it should only
> > ever touch PL0_SSP, because Linux never runs anything at CPL1 or CPL2, i.e. will
> > never consume PL{1,2}_SSP.
>
> To clarify, Linux will only use SSS in FRED mode -- FRED removes CPL1,2.
Trying to understand more what prevents SSS to enable in pre FRED, Is
it better #CP exception
handling with other nested exceptions?
Won't same problems (to some extent) happen in user-mode shadow stack
(and in case of guest, SSS inside VM)?
Thanks,
Pankaj
