Re: [PATCH RFC v8 47/56] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event

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On Fri, Feb 24, 2023 at 01:37:48PM +0100, Alexander Graf wrote:
> 
> On 20.02.23 19:38, Michael Roth wrote:
> > From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
> > 
> > Add support for the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event. This allows SEV-SNP
> > guests to alter the register state of the APs on their own. This allows
> > the guest a way of simulating INIT-SIPI.
> > 
> > A new event, KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE, is created and used
> > so as to avoid updating the VMSA pointer while the vCPU is running.
> > 
> > For CREATE
> >    The guest supplies the GPA of the VMSA to be used for the vCPU with
> >    the specified APIC ID. The GPA is saved in the svm struct of the
> >    target vCPU, the KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE event is added
> >    to the vCPU and then the vCPU is kicked.
> > 
> > For CREATE_ON_INIT:
> >    The guest supplies the GPA of the VMSA to be used for the vCPU with
> >    the specified APIC ID the next time an INIT is performed. The GPA is
> >    saved in the svm struct of the target vCPU.
> > 
> > For DESTROY:
> >    The guest indicates it wishes to stop the vCPU. The GPA is cleared
> >    from the svm struct, the KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE event is
> >    added to vCPU and then the vCPU is kicked.
> > 
> > The KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE event handler will be invoked
> > as a result of the event or as a result of an INIT. The handler sets the
> > vCPU to the KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED state, so that any errors will
> > leave the vCPU as not runnable. Any previous VMSA pages that were
> > installed as part of an SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event are un-pinned. If
> > a new VMSA is to be installed, the VMSA guest page is pinned and set as
> > the VMSA in the vCPU VMCB and the vCPU state is set to
> > KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE. If a new VMSA is not to be installed, the VMSA is
> > cleared in the vCPU VMCB and the vCPU state is left as
> > KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED to prevent it from being run.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx>
> > [mdr: add handling for restrictedmem]
> > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
> 
> 
> What is the intended boot sequence for SEV-SNP guests? FWIW with this
> interface in place, guests will typically use in-guest VMSA pages to hold
> secondary vcpu state. But that means we're now allocating 4kb of memory for
> every vcpu that we create that will be for most of the guest's lifetime
> superfluous.
> 
> Wouldn't it make more sense to have a model where we only allocate the VMSA
> for the boot CPU and leave secondary allocation to the guest? We already
> need firmware changes for SEV-SNP - may as well make this one more.

I don't think we'd necessarily need a firmware change. We could just
free original VMSA back to the hypervisor as soon as those APs come
online. The down-side to that versus deferring cleaning till guest
shutdown is there is some flushing activity (see:
sev_flush_encrypted_page()) that would now likely be occuring during
guest boot up where the overhead might be more noticeable. But for SNP
the host likely supports X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT so the overhead
probably isn't that bad.

> 
> [...]
> 
> > +
> > +static int sev_snp_ap_creation(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> > +{
> > +       struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info;
> > +       struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> > +       struct kvm_vcpu *target_vcpu;
> > +       struct vcpu_svm *target_svm;
> > +       unsigned int request;
> > +       unsigned int apic_id;
> > +       bool kick;
> > +       int ret;
> > +
> > +       request = lower_32_bits(svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1);
> > +       apic_id = upper_32_bits(svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1);
> > +
> > +       /* Validate the APIC ID */
> > +       target_vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(vcpu->kvm, apic_id);
> 
> 
> Out of curiosity: The target CPU can be my own vCPU, right?

I don't think that would be the normal behavior, but maybe with some
care it's possible for a guest to do things that way. I haven't seen
anything strictly prohibiting this in the relevant specs.

> 
> 
> > +       if (!target_vcpu) {
> > +               vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: invalid AP APIC ID [%#x] from guest\n",
> > +                           apic_id);
> > +               return -EINVAL;
> > +       }
> > +
> > +       ret = 0;
> > +
> > +       target_svm = to_svm(target_vcpu);
> > +
> > +       /*
> > +        * The target vCPU is valid, so the vCPU will be kicked unless the
> > +        * request is for CREATE_ON_INIT. For any errors at this stage, the
> > +        * kick will place the vCPU in an non-runnable state.
> > +        */
> > +       kick = true;
> > +
> > +       mutex_lock(&target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_mutex);
> > +
> > +       target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
> > +       target_svm->sev_es.snp_ap_create = true;
> > +
> > +       /* Interrupt injection mode shouldn't change for AP creation */
> > +       if (request < SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY) {
> > +               u64 sev_features;
> > +
> > +               sev_features = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
> > +               sev_features ^= sev->sev_features;
> > +               if (sev_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_INT_INJ_MODES) {
> > +                       vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: invalid AP injection mode [%#lx] from guest\n",
> > +                                   vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]);
> > +                       ret = -EINVAL;
> > +                       goto out;
> > +               }
> > +       }
> > +
> > +       switch (request) {
> > +       case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE_ON_INIT:
> > +               kick = false;
> > +               fallthrough;
> > +       case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE:
> > +               if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2)) {
> > +                       vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: invalid AP VMSA address [%#llx] from guest\n",
> > +                                   svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2);
> > +                       ret = -EINVAL;
> > +                       goto out;
> > +               }
> > +
> > +               /*
> > +                * Malicious guest can RMPADJUST a large page into VMSA which
> > +                * will hit the SNP erratum where the CPU will incorrectly signal
> > +                * an RMP violation #PF if a hugepage collides with the RMP entry
> > +                * of VMSA page, reject the AP CREATE request if VMSA address from
> > +                * guest is 2M aligned.
> 
> 
> This will break genuine current Linux kernels that just happen to allocate a
> guest page, no? In fact, given enough vCPUs you're almost guaranteed to hit
> an aligned structure somewhere. What is the guest supposed to do in that
> situation?

The initial SNP support for guest kernels already made use of
snp_alloc_vmsa_page() to do the appropriate workaround to avoid allocating
2MB-aligned VMSA pages.

-Mike

> 
> 
> 
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