On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 11:17:40AM -0600, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index 5ee0fbd98d0d..b7ae741a8c66 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -655,6 +655,173 @@ void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op
> WARN(1, "invalid memory op %d\n", op);
> }
>
> +static int vmgexit_psc(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
> +{
> + int cur_entry, end_entry, ret = 0;
> + struct snp_psc_desc *data;
> + struct ghcb_state state;
> + struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
> + unsigned long flags;
> + struct ghcb *ghcb;
> +
> + /*
> + * __sev_get_ghcb() needs to run with IRQs disabled because it is using
> + * a per-CPU GHCB.
> + */
> + local_irq_save(flags);
> +
I know the guest will terminate anyway but still...
> + ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
> + if (unlikely(!ghcb))
> + return 1;
This needs to be (btw, do you really need the unlikely()?)
if (!ghcb) {
ret = 1;
goto out_unlock;
}
and at the end you have
out:
__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
out_unlock:
local_irq_restore(flags);
...
> +static void set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages, int op)
> +{
> + unsigned long vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
> + struct snp_psc_desc *desc;
> +
> + desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (!desc)
> + panic("SEV-SNP: failed to allocate memory for PSC descriptor\n");
> +
> + vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
> + vaddr_end = vaddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
> +
> + while (vaddr < vaddr_end) {
> + /*
> + * Calculate the last vaddr that can be fit in one
"... that fits in one ... "
and then the comment *fits* :) on a single line too:
/* Calculate the last vaddr that fits in one struct snp_psc_desc. */
> + * struct snp_psc_desc.
> + */
> + next_vaddr = min_t(unsigned long, vaddr_end,
> + (VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_ENTRY * PAGE_SIZE) + vaddr);
> +
> + __set_pages_state(desc, vaddr, next_vaddr, op);
> +
> + vaddr = next_vaddr;
> + }
> +
> + kfree(desc);
> +}
...
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> index b4072115c8ef..1bc15b9d15f3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
> #include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h>
> #include <asm/mshyperv.h>
> +#include <asm/sev.h>
>
> #include "../mm_internal.h"
>
> @@ -2012,8 +2013,22 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
> */
> cpa_flush(&cpa, !this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT));
>
> + /*
> + * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guest invalidate the
> + * memory before clearing the encryption attribute.
> + */
> + if (!enc)
> + snp_set_memory_shared(addr, numpages);
> +
> ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
>
> + /*
> + * Now that memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate it
> + * so that is consistent with the above page state.
" ... so that it is consistent... "
> + */
> + if (!ret && enc)
> + snp_set_memory_private(addr, numpages);
> +
> /*
> * After changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush TLBs again
> * in case any speculative TLB caching occurred (but no need to flush
> --
> 2.25.1
>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
