Hi folks, The iommu group is the minimal isolation boundary for DMA. Devices in a group can access each other's MMIO registers via peer to peer DMA and also need share the same I/O address space. Once the I/O address space is assigned to user control it is no longer available to the dma_map* API, which effectively makes the DMA API non-working. Second, userspace can use DMA initiated by a device that it controls to access the MMIO spaces of other devices in the group. This allows userspace to indirectly attack any kernel owned device and it's driver. Therefore groups must either be entirely under kernel control or userspace control, never a mixture. Unfortunately some systems have problems with the granularity of groups and there are a couple of important exceptions: - pci_stub allows the admin to block driver binding on a device and make it permanently shared with userspace. Since PCI stub does not do DMA it is safe, however the admin must understand that using pci_stub allows userspace to attack whatever device it was bound it. - PCI bridges are sometimes included in groups. Typically PCI bridges do not use DMA, and generally do not have MMIO regions. Generally any device that does not have any MMIO registers is a possible candidate for an exception. Currently vfio adopts a workaround to detect violations of the above restrictions by monitoring the driver core BOUND event, and hardwiring the above exceptions. Since there is no way for vfio to reject driver binding at this point, BUG_ON() is triggered if a violation is captured (kernel driver BOUND event on a group which already has some devices assigned to userspace). Aside from the bad user experience this opens a way for root userspace to crash the kernel, even in high integrity configurations, by manipulating the module binding and triggering the BUG_ON. This series solves this problem by making the user/kernel ownership a core concept at the IOMMU layer. The driver core enforces kernel ownership while drivers are bound and violations now result in a error codes during probe, not BUG_ON failures. Patch partitions: [PATCH 1-2]: Detect DMA ownership conflicts during driver binding; [PATCH 3-6]: Add security context management for assigned devices; [PATCH 7-11]: Various cleanups. Ideas contributed by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx> Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx> Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Review contributors: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx> Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx> Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@xxxxxxxxx> Jacob jun Pan <jacob.jun.pan@xxxxxxxxx> Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@xxxxxxxxxx> This also is part one of three initial series for IOMMUFD: * Move IOMMU Group security into the iommu layer - Generic IOMMUFD implementation - VFIO ability to consume IOMMUFD This is based on v5.16-rc1 and available on github: https://github.com/LuBaolu/intel-iommu/commits/iommu-dma-ownership-v1 Best regards, baolu Jason Gunthorpe (1): vfio: Delete the unbound_list Lu Baolu (10): iommu: Add device dma ownership set/release interfaces driver core: Set DMA ownership during driver bind/unbind PCI: pci_stub: Suppress kernel DMA ownership auto-claiming PCI: portdrv: Suppress kernel DMA ownership auto-claiming iommu: Add security context management for assigned devices iommu: Expose group variants of dma ownership interfaces vfio: Use DMA_OWNER_USER to declaim passthrough devices vfio: Remove use of vfio_group_viable() vfio: Remove iommu group notifier iommu: Remove iommu group changes notifier include/linux/device/driver.h | 7 +- include/linux/iommu.h | 75 ++++--- drivers/base/dd.c | 12 ++ drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 274 ++++++++++++++++++-------- drivers/pci/pci-stub.c | 3 + drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv_pci.c | 2 + drivers/vfio/fsl-mc/vfio_fsl_mc.c | 1 + drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 3 + drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_amba.c | 1 + drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform.c | 1 + drivers/vfio/vfio.c | 247 ++--------------------- 11 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 332 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1
