On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 10:48:42 +0200
Cornelia Huck <cohuck@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 14:39:22 +1000
> David Gibson <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 12:16:41PM +0200, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> > > On Sun, 7 Jun 2020 13:07:35 +1000
> > > David Gibson <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > > On Sat, Jun 06, 2020 at 04:21:31PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 01:43:04PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> > > > > > The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
> > > > > > DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
> > > > > > to directly access guest memory. That doesn't work if the guest's memory
> > > > > > is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > So, if a guest memory protection mechanism is enabled, then apply the
> > > > > > iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
> > > > > > Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with the
> > > > > > hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > > hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > > > > > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > index 88d699bceb..cb6580954e 100644
> > > > > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
> > > > > > #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
> > > > > > #include "migration/vmstate.h"
> > > > > > #include "exec/guest-memory-protection.h"
> > > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
> > > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
> > > > > >
> > > > > > GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {};
> > > > > > const size_t hw_compat_5_0_len = G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_0);
> > > > > > @@ -1159,6 +1161,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
> > > > > > * areas.
> > > > > > */
> > > > > > machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + /*
> > > > > > + * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
> > > > > > + * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
> > > > > > + * mechanisms. That requires disabling legacy virtio support
> > > > > > + * for virtio pci devices
> > > > > > + */
> > > > > > + object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, "disable-legacy", "on");
> > > > > > + object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, "iommu_platform", "on");
> > > > > > }
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > I think it's a reasonable way to address this overall.
> > > > > As Cornelia has commented, addressing ccw as well
> > > >
> > > > Sure. I was assuming somebody who actually knows ccw could do that as
> > > > a follow up.
> > >
> > > FWIW, I think we could simply enable iommu_platform for protected
> > > guests for ccw; no prereqs like pci's disable-legacy.
> >
> > Right, and the code above should in fact already do so, since it
> > applies that to TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, which is common. The
> > disable-legacy part should be harmless for s390, since this is
> > effectively just setting a default, and we don't expect any
> > TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI devices to be instantiated on z.
>
> Well, virtio-pci is available on s390, so people could try to use it --
> however, forcing disable-legacy won't hurt in that case, as it won't
> make the situation worse (I don't expect virtio-pci to work on s390
> protected guests.)
Currently we don't have to worry about virtio-pci when running in
protected mode, because PCI is not supported currently, and this is
enforced by the ultravisor which would inject operation exceptions should
a PV guest try to use our PCI instructions.
[..]
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