On Sun, 7 Jun 2020 13:07:35 +1000
David Gibson <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 06, 2020 at 04:21:31PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 01:43:04PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> > > The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
> > > DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
> > > to directly access guest memory. That doesn't work if the guest's memory
> > > is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.
> > >
> > > So, if a guest memory protection mechanism is enabled, then apply the
> > > iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
> > > Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with the
> > > hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > ---
> > > hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > index 88d699bceb..cb6580954e 100644
> > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
> > > #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
> > > #include "migration/vmstate.h"
> > > #include "exec/guest-memory-protection.h"
> > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
> > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
> > >
> > > GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {};
> > > const size_t hw_compat_5_0_len = G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_0);
> > > @@ -1159,6 +1161,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
> > > * areas.
> > > */
> > > machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
> > > +
> > > + /*
> > > + * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
> > > + * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
> > > + * mechanisms. That requires disabling legacy virtio support
> > > + * for virtio pci devices
> > > + */
> > > + object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, "disable-legacy", "on");
> > > + object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, "iommu_platform", "on");
> > > }
> > >
> >
> > I think it's a reasonable way to address this overall.
> > As Cornelia has commented, addressing ccw as well
>
> Sure. I was assuming somebody who actually knows ccw could do that as
> a follow up.
FWIW, I think we could simply enable iommu_platform for protected
guests for ccw; no prereqs like pci's disable-legacy.
>
> > as cases where user has
> > specified the property manually could be worth-while.
>
> I don't really see what's to be done there. I'm assuming that if the
> user specifies it, they know what they're doing - particularly with
> nonstandard guests there are some odd edge cases where those
> combinations might work, they're just not very likely.
If I understood Halil correctly, devices without iommu_platform
apparently can crash protected guests on s390. Is that supposed to be a
"if it breaks, you get to keep the pieces" situation, or do we really
want to enforce iommu_platform?
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