On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 05:40:46PM +0200, Halil Pasic wrote:
> On Tue, 9 Jun 2020 12:16:41 +0200
> Cornelia Huck <cohuck@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > On Sun, 7 Jun 2020 13:07:35 +1000
> > David Gibson <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > > On Sat, Jun 06, 2020 at 04:21:31PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 01:43:04PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> > > > > The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
> > > > > DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
> > > > > to directly access guest memory. That doesn't work if the guest's memory
> > > > > is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.
> > > > >
> > > > > So, if a guest memory protection mechanism is enabled, then apply the
> > > > > iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
> > > > > Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with the
> > > > > hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
> > > > >
> > > > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > > > > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > index 88d699bceb..cb6580954e 100644
> > > > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
> > > > > #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
> > > > > #include "migration/vmstate.h"
> > > > > #include "exec/guest-memory-protection.h"
> > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
> > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
> > > > >
> > > > > GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {};
> > > > > const size_t hw_compat_5_0_len = G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_0);
> > > > > @@ -1159,6 +1161,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
> > > > > * areas.
> > > > > */
> > > > > machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
> > > > > +
> > > > > + /*
> > > > > + * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
> > > > > + * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
> > > > > + * mechanisms. That requires disabling legacy virtio support
> > > > > + * for virtio pci devices
> > > > > + */
> > > > > + object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, "disable-legacy", "on");
> > > > > + object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, "iommu_platform", "on");
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > I think it's a reasonable way to address this overall.
> > > > As Cornelia has commented, addressing ccw as well
> > >
> > > Sure. I was assuming somebody who actually knows ccw could do that as
> > > a follow up.
> >
> > FWIW, I think we could simply enable iommu_platform for protected
> > guests for ccw; no prereqs like pci's disable-legacy.
>
> For s390x having a memory-encryption object is not prereq for doing
> protected virtualization, so the scheme does not work for us right now.
That's basically true for POWER as well - in our case the "memory
encrypt" object (called "host trust limitation" (HTL) object in the
latest version) is basically just a dummy with no parameters. The
same should work for s390x.
I am considering having the machine always create the HTL object with
a well-known name (e.g. "pef0"), so you can just set the machine
property to it to enable PEF. Again, that could also be done on
s390x.
Note also that anything could in principle implement the HTL
interface. So you could have the machine object itelf, or the cpu
implement the interface to avoid creating a dummy object, though that
might get messier that just having a dummy in the long run.
> I hope Jansoch will chime in after he is back from his vacation. IMHO
> having a memory-protection object will come in handy for migration,
> but the presence or absence of this object should be largely transparent
> to the user (and not something that needs to be explicitly managed via
> command line). AFAIU this object is in the end it is just QEMU plumbing.
Yes. However, if either POWER or z ever gets any configurable knobs
for their protection systems, it does provide an obvious place that we
can do that configuration.
> > > > as cases where user has
> > > > specified the property manually could be worth-while.
> > >
> > > I don't really see what's to be done there. I'm assuming that if the
> > > user specifies it, they know what they're doing - particularly with
> > > nonstandard guests there are some odd edge cases where those
> > > combinations might work, they're just not very likely.
> >
> > If I understood Halil correctly, devices without iommu_platform
> > apparently can crash protected guests on s390. Is that supposed to be a
> > "if it breaks, you get to keep the pieces" situation, or do we really
> > want to enforce iommu_platform?
>
> I strongly oppose to adopting the "if it breaks, you get to keep the
> pieces" strategy here. It is borderline acceptable on startup, although
> IMHO not preferable, but a device hotplug bringing down a guest that is
> already running userspace is not acceptable at all.
>
> Regards,
> Halil
--
David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_
| _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson
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