> On 12 Nov 2018, at 22:39, Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 9:32 AM, Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 24, 2018 at 7:39 PM, Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 02:08, Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> As specified in Intel's SDM, do not allow the L1 hypervisor to launch
>>>> an L2 guest with the VM-execution controls for "unrestricted guest" or
>>>> "mode-based execute control for EPT" set and the VM-execution control
>>>> for "enable EPT" clear.
>>>>
>>>> Note that the VM-execution control for "mode-based execute control for
>>>> EPT" is not yet virtualized by kvm.
>>>>
>>>> Reported-by: Andrew Thornton <andrewth@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>
>>> Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 1 +
>>>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>> 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
>>>> index 9527ba5d62da..665632a4b54b 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
>>>> @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
>>>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING 0x00010000
>>>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML 0x00020000
>>>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES 0x00100000
>>>> +#define SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC 0x00400000
>>>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING 0x02000000
>>>>
>>>> #define PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK 0x00000001
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>>> index 06412ba46aa3..b78607dd113c 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>>> @@ -11775,6 +11775,24 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_pml_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>>> return 0;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> +static int nested_vmx_check_unrestricted_guest_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>>> + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>>>> +{
>>>> + if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST) &&
>>>> + !nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12))
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int nested_vmx_check_mode_based_ept_exec_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>>> + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>>>> +{
>>>> + if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC) &&
>>>> + !nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12))
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> static int nested_vmx_check_shadow_vmcs_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>>> struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>>>> {
>>>> @@ -12397,6 +12415,12 @@ static int check_vmentry_prereqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>>>> if (nested_vmx_check_pml_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
>>>> return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD;
>>>>
>>>> + if (nested_vmx_check_unrestricted_guest_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
>>>> + return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (nested_vmx_check_mode_based_ept_exec_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
>>>> + return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD;
>>>> +
>>>> if (nested_vmx_check_shadow_vmcs_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
>>>> return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD;
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> 2.19.0.444.g18242da7ef-goog
>>>>
>>
>> Ping?
>
> Should I construe the continued silence as rejection?
LOL. I believe this was just missed.
Looking at the code, you can at least have my approval:
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@xxxxxxxxxx>
P.S:
I would have maybe also gather together all the EPT related controls pre checks (besides the one related to eptp-switching)
on a single nested_vmx_check_ept_related_controls(). But that’s a matter of taste.
