On Mon, Sep 24, 2018 at 7:39 PM, Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 02:08, Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> As specified in Intel's SDM, do not allow the L1 hypervisor to launch
>> an L2 guest with the VM-execution controls for "unrestricted guest" or
>> "mode-based execute control for EPT" set and the VM-execution control
>> for "enable EPT" clear.
>>
>> Note that the VM-execution control for "mode-based execute control for
>> EPT" is not yet virtualized by kvm.
>>
>> Reported-by: Andrew Thornton <andrewth@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 1 +
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
>> index 9527ba5d62da..665632a4b54b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
>> @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING 0x00010000
>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML 0x00020000
>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES 0x00100000
>> +#define SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC 0x00400000
>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING 0x02000000
>>
>> #define PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK 0x00000001
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> index 06412ba46aa3..b78607dd113c 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> @@ -11775,6 +11775,24 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_pml_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> +static int nested_vmx_check_unrestricted_guest_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>> +{
>> + if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST) &&
>> + !nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int nested_vmx_check_mode_based_ept_exec_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>> +{
>> + if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC) &&
>> + !nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> static int nested_vmx_check_shadow_vmcs_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>> {
>> @@ -12397,6 +12415,12 @@ static int check_vmentry_prereqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>> if (nested_vmx_check_pml_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
>> return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD;
>>
>> + if (nested_vmx_check_unrestricted_guest_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
>> + return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD;
>> +
>> + if (nested_vmx_check_mode_based_ept_exec_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
>> + return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD;
>> +
>> if (nested_vmx_check_shadow_vmcs_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
>> return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD;
>>
>> --
>> 2.19.0.444.g18242da7ef-goog
>>
Ping?
