Re: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds

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On 09/01/18 19:39, Suraj Jitindar Singh wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 15:48 +1100, Paul Mackerras wrote:
>> This adds three new capabilities that give userspace information
>> about
>> the underlying machine's level of vulnerability to the Meltdown and
>> Spectre attacks, and what instructions the hardware implements to
>> assist software to work around the vulnerabilities.
>>
>> Each capability is a tri-state, where 0 indicates that the machine is
>> vulnerable and no workarounds are implement, 1 indicates that the
>> machine is vulnerable but workaround assist instructions are
>> available, and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
>>
>> The capabilities are:
>>
>> KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE reports the vulnerability of the machine to
>> attacks based on using speculative loads to data in L1 cache which
>> should not be addressable.  The workaround provided by hardware is an
>> instruction to invalidate the entire L1 data cache.
>>
>> KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK reports the vulnerability of the
>> machine
>> to attacks based on using speculative loads behind mispredicted
>> bounds
>> checks.  The workaround provided by hardware is an instruction that
>> acts as a speculation barrier.
>>
>> KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH reports the vulnerability of the
>> machine to attacks based on poisoning the indirect branch predictor.
>> No workaround that requires software changes is provided; the current
>> hardware fix is to prevent speculation past indirect branches.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> Note: This patch depends on the patch "powerpc/pseries: Add
>> H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags & wrapper" by Michael Ellerman,
>> available at http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/856914/ .
>>
>>  Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt |  36 +++++++
>>  arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c        | 202
>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  include/uapi/linux/kvm.h          |   3 +
>>  3 files changed, 241 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
>> b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
>> index 57d3ee9..8d76260 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
>> +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
>> @@ -4369,3 +4369,39 @@ Parameters: none
>>  This capability indicates if the flic device will be able to get/set
>> the
>>  AIS states for migration via the KVM_DEV_FLIC_AISM_ALL attribute and
>> allows
>>  to discover this without having to create a flic device.
>> +
>> +8.14 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE
>> +
>> +Architectures: ppc
>> +
>> +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
>> +vulnerability or otherwise to the Meltdown attack.  Its value is a
>> +tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is vulnerable, 1 indicates
>> the
>> +hardware is vulnerable but provides assistance to work around the
>> +vulnerability (specifically by providing a fast L1 data cache flush
>> +facility), and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
>> +
>> +8.15 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK
>> +
>> +Architectures: ppc
>> +
>> +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
>> +vulnerability or otherwise to the bounds-check variant of the
>> Spectre
>> +attack.  Its value is a tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is
>> +vulnerable, 1 indicates the hardware is vulnerable but provides
>> +assistance to work around the vulnerability (specifically by
>> providing
>> +an instruction that acts as a speculation barrier), and 2 indicates
>> +that the machine is not vulnerable.
>> +
>> +8.16 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH
>> +
>> +Architectures: ppc
>> +
>> +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
>> +vulnerability or otherwise to the indirect branch variant of the
>> Spectre
>> +attack.  Its value is a tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is
>> +vulnerable and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
>> +(1 would indicate the availability of a workaround that software
>> +needs to implement, but there is currently no workaround that needs
>> +software changes.)
>> +
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
>> index 1915e86..58e863b 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
>> @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@
>>  #include <asm/iommu.h>
>>  #include <asm/switch_to.h>
>>  #include <asm/xive.h>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
>> +#include <asm/hvcall.h>
>> +#include <asm/plpar_wrappers.h>
>> +#endif
>>  
>>  #include "timing.h"
>>  #include "irq.h"
>> @@ -488,6 +492,193 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
>>  	module_put(kvm->arch.kvm_ops->owner);
>>  }
>>  
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
>> +/*
>> + * These functions check whether the underlying hardware is safe
>> + * against the Meltdown/Spectre attacks and whether it supplies
>> + * instructions for use in workarounds.  The information comes from
>> + * firmware, either via the device tree on powernv platforms or
>> + * from an hcall on pseries platforms.
>> + *
>> + * For check_safe_cache() and check_safe_bounds_check(), a return
>> + * value of 0 means vulnerable, 1 means vulnerable but workaround
>> + * instructions are provided, and 2 means not vulnerable (no
>> workaround
>> + * is needed).
>> + * For check_safe_indirect_branch(), 0 means vulnerable and 2 means
>> + * not vulnerable.
>> + */
>> +static inline bool have_fw_feat(struct device_node *fw_features,
>> +				const char *state, const char *name)
>> +{
>> +	struct device_node *np;
>> +	bool r = false;
>> +
>> +	np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, name);
>> +	if (np) {
>> +		r = of_property_read_bool(np, state);
>> +		of_node_put(np);
>> +	}
>> +	return r;
>> +}
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
>> +static bool check_pseries_safe_cache(int *rp)
>> +{
>> +	struct h_cpu_char_result c;
>> +	unsigned long rc;
>> +	int r = 0;
>> +
>> +	if (!machine_is(pseries))
>> +		return false;
>> +
>> +	rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
>> +	if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
>> +		if (!(c.behavior & 
> 
> s/behavior/behaviour

Why?
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/behavior



-- 
Alexey



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