On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 15:48 +1100, Paul Mackerras wrote: > This adds three new capabilities that give userspace information > about > the underlying machine's level of vulnerability to the Meltdown and > Spectre attacks, and what instructions the hardware implements to > assist software to work around the vulnerabilities. > > Each capability is a tri-state, where 0 indicates that the machine is > vulnerable and no workarounds are implement, 1 indicates that the > machine is vulnerable but workaround assist instructions are > available, and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable. > > The capabilities are: > > KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE reports the vulnerability of the machine to > attacks based on using speculative loads to data in L1 cache which > should not be addressable. The workaround provided by hardware is an > instruction to invalidate the entire L1 data cache. > > KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK reports the vulnerability of the > machine > to attacks based on using speculative loads behind mispredicted > bounds > checks. The workaround provided by hardware is an instruction that > acts as a speculation barrier. > > KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH reports the vulnerability of the > machine to attacks based on poisoning the indirect branch predictor. > No workaround that requires software changes is provided; the current > hardware fix is to prevent speculation past indirect branches. > > Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > Note: This patch depends on the patch "powerpc/pseries: Add > H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags & wrapper" by Michael Ellerman, > available at http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/856914/ . > > Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt | 36 +++++++ > arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 202 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 3 + > 3 files changed, 241 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt > b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt > index 57d3ee9..8d76260 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt > +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt > @@ -4369,3 +4369,39 @@ Parameters: none > This capability indicates if the flic device will be able to get/set > the > AIS states for migration via the KVM_DEV_FLIC_AISM_ALL attribute and > allows > to discover this without having to create a flic device. > + > +8.14 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE > + > +Architectures: ppc > + > +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's > +vulnerability or otherwise to the Meltdown attack. Its value is a > +tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is vulnerable, 1 indicates > the > +hardware is vulnerable but provides assistance to work around the > +vulnerability (specifically by providing a fast L1 data cache flush > +facility), and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable. > + > +8.15 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK > + > +Architectures: ppc > + > +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's > +vulnerability or otherwise to the bounds-check variant of the > Spectre > +attack. Its value is a tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is > +vulnerable, 1 indicates the hardware is vulnerable but provides > +assistance to work around the vulnerability (specifically by > providing > +an instruction that acts as a speculation barrier), and 2 indicates > +that the machine is not vulnerable. > + > +8.16 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH > + > +Architectures: ppc > + > +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's > +vulnerability or otherwise to the indirect branch variant of the > Spectre > +attack. Its value is a tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is > +vulnerable and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable. > +(1 would indicate the availability of a workaround that software > +needs to implement, but there is currently no workaround that needs > +software changes.) > + > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c > index 1915e86..58e863b 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c > @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ > #include <asm/iommu.h> > #include <asm/switch_to.h> > #include <asm/xive.h> > +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES > +#include <asm/hvcall.h> > +#include <asm/plpar_wrappers.h> > +#endif > > #include "timing.h" > #include "irq.h" > @@ -488,6 +492,193 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm) > module_put(kvm->arch.kvm_ops->owner); > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 > +/* > + * These functions check whether the underlying hardware is safe > + * against the Meltdown/Spectre attacks and whether it supplies > + * instructions for use in workarounds. The information comes from > + * firmware, either via the device tree on powernv platforms or > + * from an hcall on pseries platforms. > + * > + * For check_safe_cache() and check_safe_bounds_check(), a return > + * value of 0 means vulnerable, 1 means vulnerable but workaround > + * instructions are provided, and 2 means not vulnerable (no > workaround > + * is needed). > + * For check_safe_indirect_branch(), 0 means vulnerable and 2 means > + * not vulnerable. > + */ > +static inline bool have_fw_feat(struct device_node *fw_features, > + const char *state, const char *name) > +{ > + struct device_node *np; > + bool r = false; > + > + np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, name); > + if (np) { > + r = of_property_read_bool(np, state); > + of_node_put(np); > + } > + return r; > +} > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES > +static bool check_pseries_safe_cache(int *rp) > +{ > + struct h_cpu_char_result c; > + unsigned long rc; > + int r = 0; > + > + if (!machine_is(pseries)) > + return false; > + > + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c); > + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) { > + if (!(c.behavior & s/behavior/behaviour > H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV)) > + r = 2; > + else if ((c.character & > H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE) && > + ((c.character & > H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH) || > + (c.character & > H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_MTTRIG2_L1_FLUSH))) > + r = 1; > + } > + *rp = r; > + return true; > +} > + > +static bool check_pseries_safe_bounds_check(int *rp) > +{ > + struct h_cpu_char_result c; > + unsigned long rc; > + int r = 0; > + > + if (!machine_is(pseries)) > + return false; > + > + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c); > + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) { > + if (!(c.behavior & s/behavior/behaviour > H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_SPEC_BAR_BNDS_CHK)) > + r = 2; > + else if (c.character & > H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI31_SPEC_BAR) > + r = 1; > + } > + *rp = r; > + return true; > +} > + > +static bool check_pseries_safe_indirect_branch(int *rp) > +{ > + struct h_cpu_char_result c; > + unsigned long rc; > + int r = 0; > + > + if (!machine_is(pseries)) > + return false; > + > + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c); > + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) { > + if (c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_BCCTR_SERIAL) > + r = 2; > + } > + *rp = r; > + return true; > +} > + > +#else > +static bool check_pseries_safe_cache(int *rp) > +{ > + return false; > +} > + > +static bool check_pseries_safe_bounds_check(int *rp) > +{ > + return false; > +} > + > +static bool check_pseries_safe_indirect_branch(int *rp) > +{ > + return false; > +} > +#endif > + > +static int check_safe_cache(void) > +{ > + struct device_node *np, *fw_features; > + int r = 0; > + > + if (check_pseries_safe_cache(&r)) > + return r; > + > + np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal"); > + if (np) { > + fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw- > features"); > + of_node_put(np); > + if (!fw_features) > + return 0; > + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "disabled", > + "needs-l1d-flush-msr-pr-0-to-1")) > + r = 2; > + else if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled", > + "fw-l1d-thread-split") && > + (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled", > + "inst-l1d-flush-trig2") || > + have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled", > + "inst-l1d-flush- > ori30,30,0"))) > + r = 1; > + of_node_put(fw_features); > + } > + > + return r; > +} > + > +static int check_safe_bounds_check(void) > +{ > + struct device_node *np, *fw_features; > + int r = 0; > + > + if (check_pseries_safe_bounds_check(&r)) > + return r; > + > + np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal"); > + if (np) { > + fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw- > features"); > + of_node_put(np); > + if (!fw_features) > + return 0; > + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "disabled", > + "needs-spec-barrier-for-bound- > checks")) > + r = 2; > + else if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled", > + "inst-spec-barrier- > ori31,31,0")) > + r = 1; > + of_node_put(fw_features); > + } > + > + return r; > +} > + > +static int check_safe_indirect_branch(void) > +{ > + struct device_node *np, *fw_features; > + int r = 0; > + > + if (check_pseries_safe_indirect_branch(&r)) > + return r; > + > + np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal"); > + if (np) { > + fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw- > features"); > + of_node_put(np); > + if (!fw_features) > + return 0; > + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled", > + "fw-bcctrl-serialized")) > + r = 2; > + of_node_put(fw_features); > + } > + > + return r; > +} > +#endif > + > int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) > { > int r; > @@ -646,6 +837,17 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm > *kvm, long ext) > r = hv_enabled && > (cur_cpu_spec->cpu_user_features2 & > PPC_FEATURE2_HTM_COMP); > break; > +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 > + case KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE: > + r = check_safe_cache(); > + break; > + case KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK: > + r = check_safe_bounds_check(); > + break; > + case KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH: > + r = check_safe_indirect_branch(); > + break; > +#endif > default: > r = 0; > break; > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > index 496e59a..0a480e9 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > @@ -932,6 +932,9 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { > #define KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2 148 > #define KVM_CAP_HYPERV_VP_INDEX 149 > #define KVM_CAP_S390_AIS_MIGRATION 150 > +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE 151 > +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK 152 > +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH 153 > > #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING >
