On 29/11/17 14:57, David Gibson wrote: > On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 02:25:43PM +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote: >> On 22/11/17 17:51, David Gibson wrote: >>> On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 10:14:45PM -0700, Alex Williamson wrote: >>>> On Wed, 22 Nov 2017 15:44:55 +1100 >>>> David Gibson <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 09:28:46PM -0700, Alex Williamson wrote: >>>>>> On Wed, 22 Nov 2017 15:09:32 +1100 >>>>>> Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> By default VFIO disables mapping of MSIX BAR to the userspace as >>>>>>> the userspace may program it in a way allowing spurious interrupts; >>>>>>> instead the userspace uses the VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This works fine as long as the system page size equals to the MSIX >>>>>>> alignment requirement which is 4KB. However with a bigger page size >>>>>>> the existing code prohibits mapping non-MSIX parts of a page with MSIX >>>>>>> structures so these parts have to be emulated via slow reads/writes on >>>>>>> a VFIO device fd. If these emulated bits are accessed often, this has >>>>>>> serious impact on performance. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This adds an ioctl to the vfio-pci device which hides the sparse >>>>>>> capability and allows the userspace to map a BAR with MSIX structures. >>>>>> >>>>>> So the user is in control of telling the kernel whether they're allowed >>>>>> to mmap the msi-x vector table. That makes absolutely no sense. If >>>>>> you're trying to figure out how userspace knows whether to implicitly >>>>>> avoid mmap'ing the msix region, I think there are far better ways in >>>>>> the existing region info ioctl. We could use a flag, or maybe the >>>>>> existence of a capability chain pointer, or a new capability. But >>>>>> absolutely not this. The kernel needs to decide whether it's going to >>>>>> let the user do this, not the user. Thanks, >>>>> >>>>> No, it doesn't. This is actually the approach we discussed in Prague. >>>>> >>>>> Remember that intercepting access to the MSI-X table is not a host >>>>> safety / security issue. It's just that without that we won't wire up >>>>> the device's MSI-X vectors properly so they won't work. >>>>> >>>>> Basically the decision here is between >>>>> >>>>> A) Allow MSI-X configuration via standard PCI mechanisms, at the >>>>> cost of making access slow for any registers sharing a page with >>>>> the MSI-X table. >>>>> >>>>> or >>>>> >>>>> B) Make access to BAR registers sharing a page with the MSI-X table >>>>> fast, at the cost of requiring some alternative mechanism to >>>>> configure MSI-X vectors. >>>>> >>>>> And that is a tradeoff that it is reasonable for userspace to make. >>>>> >>>>> In the case of KVM guests, the decision depends entirely on the >>>>> *guest* platform. Usually we need (A) because the guest expects to be >>>>> able to poke the MSI-X table in the usual way. However for PAPR >>>>> guests, there's an alternative mechanism via an RTAS call, which means >>>>> we can use (B). >>>>> >>>>> The host kernel can't make this decision, because it doesn't know the >>>>> guest platform (well, KVM might, but VFIO doesn't). >>>>> >>>>> A userspace VFIO program could also elect for (B) if it does care >>>>> about performance of access to registers in the same BAR as the MSI-X >>>>> table, but doesn't need MSI-X for example. >>>> >>>> You're asking for an ioctl to allow the kernel to allow the user to >>>> mmap the page, when instead we could just allow the user to mmap the >>>> page and whether the user does that and how they make use of it is up >>>> to them... >>> >>> Duh. Sorry. For some reason I was thinking the magic MSI-X >>> interception was happening in the host kernel rather than in qemu. >>> >>>> I understand that there are different virtualization techniques at play >>>> here, it just doesn't seem relevant. In the case of (A), the user can >>>> choose not to mmap the page overlapping the vector table even if the >>>> kernel allows it. The user can also choose to mmap that page, but not >>>> use the portion overlapping the vector table. QEMU already does this >>>> by overlaying a MemoryRegion for vector table emulation. We might even >>>> be able to get away with mmaping that page and emulating the vector >>>> table elsewhere, which seems like the only option for a 64k page ARM >>>> system. For (B), clearly it's just a nuisance that we can't currently >>>> mmap this page, but I still don't see how the user allowing the kernel >>>> to allow the user to mmap that page makes any sense. I can't even >>>> describe it without it sounding ridiculous. Thanks, >>> >>> Right. Rethinking.. it seems to me we should just completely remove >>> the logic from the kernel banning mmap()s overlapping the MSI-X >>> table. All it does is poorly attempt to stop the user shooting >>> themselves in the foot. >>> >>> Then we just need logic in qemu to avoid doing the overlapping memory >>> region nonsense on a per-machine basis >> >> >> So is there still any plan or we just ditch the feature? I am confused now. > > The plan is what I said above. Remove the bogus check logic from the > kernel, then solve within qemu, by not creating the MSI-X intercept > region for pseries guests. There were 2 proposals how to do that. Both included platform code to decide whether to allow mapping or not and some transport to pass that enablement flag from the plafform code to the VFIO-PCI driver, one was via an IOMMU group flag, the other via a PCI bus flag. Neither was accepted so reposting those won't make any progress, what do I miss here? Was there any agreement on how to do this? -- Alexey
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