Re: [PATCH v5 3/7] KVM: x86: Allow to use bitmap in ring-based dirty page tracking

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On Mon, Oct 10, 2022 at 11:18:55PM +0000, Oliver Upton wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 07, 2022 at 10:31:49AM -0400, Peter Xu wrote:
> 
> [...]
> 
> > > - In kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_dirty_log_ring(), set 'dirty_ring_allow_bitmap' to
> > >   true when the capability is KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LONG_RING_ACQ_REL
> > 
> > What I wanted to do is to decouple the ACQ_REL with ALLOW_BITMAP, so mostly
> > as what you suggested, except..
> 
> +1
> 
> > > 
> > >   static int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_dirty_log_ring(struct kvm *kvm, u32 cap, u32 size)
> > >   {
> > >     :
> > >     mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
> > > 
> > >     if (kvm->created_vcpus) {
> > >        /* We don't allow to change this value after vcpu created */
> > >        r = -EINVAL;
> > >     } else {
> > >        kvm->dirty_ring_size = size;
> > 
> > .. here I'd not set dirty_ring_allow_bitmap at all so I'd drop below line,
> > instead..
> > 
> > >        kvm->dirty_ring_allow_bitmap = (cap == KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL);
> > >        r = 0;
> > >     }
> > > 
> > >     mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
> > >     return r;
> > >   }
> > > - In kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(), KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ALLOW_BITMAP
> > >   is always flase until KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL is enabled.
> > > 
> > >   static long kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(...)
> > >   {
> > >     :
> > >     case KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ALLOW_BITMAP:
> > >         return kvm->dirty_ring_allow_bitmap ? 1 : 0;
> > 
> > ... here we always return 1, OTOH in kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap_generic():
> > 
> >       case KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ALLOW_BITMAP:
> >            if (kvm->dirty_ring_size)
> >                 return -EINVAL;
> >            kvm->dirty_ring_allow_bitmap = true;
> >            return 0;
> > 
> > A side effect of checking dirty_ring_size is then we'll be sure to have no
> > vcpu created too.  Maybe we should also check no memslot created to make
> > sure the bitmaps are not created.
> 
> I'm not sure I follow... What prevents userspace from creating a vCPU
> between enabling the two caps?
> 
> > Then if the userspace wants to use the bitmap altogether with the ring, it
> > needs to first detect KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ALLOW_BITMAP and enable it
> > before it enables KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING.
> > 
> > One trick on ALLOW_BITMAP is in mark_page_dirty_in_slot() - after we allow
> > !vcpu case we'll need to make sure it won't accidentally try to set bitmap
> > for !ALLOW_BITMAP, because in that case the bitmap pointer is NULL so
> > set_bit_le() will directly crash the kernel.
> > 
> > We could keep the old flavor of having a WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu &&
> > !ALLOW_BITMAP) then return, but since now the userspace can easily trigger
> > this (e.g. on ARM, a malicious userapp can have DIRTY_RING &&
> > !ALLOW_BITMAP, then it can simply trigger the gic ioctl to trigger host
> > warning), I think the better approach is we can kill the process in that
> > case.  Not sure whether there's anything better we can do.
> 
> I don't believe !ALLOW_BITMAP && DIRTY_RING is a valid configuration for
> arm64 given the fact that we'll dirty memory outside of a vCPU context.
> 
> Could ALLOW_BITMAP be a requirement of DIRTY_RING, thereby making
> userspace fail fast? Otherwise (at least on arm64) your VM is DOA on the
> target. With that the old WARN() could be preserved, as you suggest. On
> top of that there would no longer be a need to test for memslot creation
> when userspace attempts to enable KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ALLOW_BITMAP.

Just to be explicit...

I don't believe ALLOW_BITMAP needs to be generally advertized on
architectures that select DIRTY_RING. Instead, architectures (just arm64
right now) should select ALLOW_BITMAP if they need to dirty memory
outside of a vCPU.

When ALLOW_BITMAP is selected, KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING[_ACQ_REL] has the
additional restriction that KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ALLOW_BITMAP has been
enabled first.

--
Thanks,
Oliver
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