On Fri, Apr 22, 2022, David Matlack wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> index a8a755e1561d..97bf53b29b88 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> @@ -978,7 +978,8 @@ static gpa_t FNAME(gva_to_gpa)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
> }
>
> /*
> - * Using the cached information from sp->gfns is safe because:
> + * Using the information in sp->shadowed_translation (kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn()
> + * and kvm_mmu_page_get_access()) is safe because:
> * - The spte has a reference to the struct page, so the pfn for a given gfn
> * can't change unless all sptes pointing to it are nuked first.
> *
> @@ -1052,12 +1053,15 @@ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
> if (sync_mmio_spte(vcpu, &sp->spt[i], gfn, pte_access))
> continue;
>
> - if (gfn != sp->gfns[i]) {
> + if (gfn != kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, i)) {
> drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, &sp->spt[i]);
> flush = true;
> continue;
> }
>
> + if (pte_access != kvm_mmu_page_get_access(sp, i))
> + kvm_mmu_page_set_access(sp, i, pte_access);
Very tangentially related, and more an FYI than anything else (I'll send a patch
separately)... Replying here because this got me wondering about the validity of
pte_access.
There's an existing bug for nEPT here, which I proved after 3 hours of fighting
with KUT's EPT tests (ugh).
1. execute-only EPT entries are supported
2. L1 creates a upper-level RW EPTE and a 4kb leaf RW EPTE
3. L2 accesses the address; KVM installs a SPTE
4. L1 modifies the leaf EPTE to be X-only, and does INVEPT
5. ept_sync_page() creates a SPTE with pte_access=0 / RWX=0
The logic for pte_access (just above this code) is:
pte_access = sp->role.access;
pte_access &= FNAME(gpte_access)(gpte);
The parent guest EPTE is 'RW', and so sp->role.access is 'RW'. When the new 'X'
EPTE is ANDed with the 'RW' parent protections, the result is a RWX=0 SPTE. This
is only possible if execute-only is supported, because otherwise PTEs are always
readable, i.e. shadow_present_mask is non-zero.
I don't think anything bad happens per se, but it's odd to have a !PRESENT in
hardware, shadow-present SPTE. I think the correct/easiest fix is:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index b025decf610d..f8ea881cfce6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
if (sync_mmio_spte(vcpu, &sp->spt[i], gfn, pte_access))
continue;
- if (gfn != sp->gfns[i]) {
+ if ((!pte_access && !shadow_present_mask) || gfn != sp->gfns[i]) {
drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, &sp->spt[i]);
flush = true;
continue;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
index 75c9e87d446a..9ad60662beac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ bool make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
u64 spte = SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK;
bool wrprot = false;
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!pte_access && !shadow_present_mask);
+
if (sp->role.ad_disabled)
spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED_MASK;
else if (kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(sp))
> +
> sptep = &sp->spt[i];
> spte = *sptep;
> host_writable = spte & shadow_host_writable_mask;
> --
> 2.36.0.rc2.479.g8af0fa9b8e-goog
>
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