On Mon, 17 May 2021 13:32:37 +0100, Steven Price <steven.price@xxxxxxx> wrote: > > It's now safe for the VMM to enable MTE in a guest, so expose the > capability to user space. > > Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@xxxxxxx> > --- > arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 9 +++++++++ > arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 3 +++ > 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c > index 1cb39c0803a4..e89a5e275e25 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c > @@ -93,6 +93,12 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, > r = 0; > kvm->arch.return_nisv_io_abort_to_user = true; > break; > + case KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE: > + if (!system_supports_mte() || kvm->created_vcpus) > + return -EINVAL; > + r = 0; > + kvm->arch.mte_enabled = true; As far as I can tell from the architecture, this isn't valid for a 32bit guest. M. -- Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible. _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list kvmarm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
