On 14 September 2014 15:57, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > So, in summary, there is a concern that a malicious guest may request > a cachable mapping for a device range, in an attempt to manipulate the > VGIC or other device memory of another VM. > I think that concern only applies to writable mappings I think it also applies to read-only mappings, because it would still be permitting the guest to set up a situation with mismatched memory attributes with potentially unpleasant effects for the other guest (which no longer gets the guarantees it should get from the fact it has mapped the VGIC as Device memory). thanks -- PMM _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list kvmarm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
