On Fri, 2008-09-19 at 09:58 -0700, david@xxxxxxx wrote: > On Thu, 18 Sep 2008, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > On Thu, 2008-09-18 at 11:09 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > >> Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > >> > >>> On Thu, 2008-09-18 at 08:38 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > >>>> I do however think that the mantra that we can't require users to update > >>>> policy for kernel changes is unsupportable in general. The precise set > >>>> of permission checks on a given operation is not set in stone and it is > >>>> not part of the kernel/userland interface/contract. Policy isn't > >>>> "userspace"; it governs what userspace can do, and it has to adapt to > >>>> kernel changes. > >>> > >>> I should note here that for changes to SELinux, we have gone out of our > >>> way to avoid such breakage to date through the introduction of > >>> compatibility switches, policy flags to enable any new checks, etc > >>> (albeit at a cost in complexity and ever creeping compatibility code). > >>> But changes to the rest of the kernel can just as easily alter the set > >>> of permission checks that get applied on a given operation, and I don't > >>> think we are always going to be able to guarantee that new kernel + old > >>> policy will Just Work. > >> > >> I know of at least 2 more directories that I intend to turn into > >> symlinks into somewhere under /proc/self. How do we keep from > >> breaking selinux policies when I do that? > > > > I suspect we could tweak the logic in selinux_proc_get_sid() to always > > label all symlinks under /proc with the base proc_t type already used > > for e.g. /proc/self, at which point existing policies would be ok. > > so if proc is mounted anywhere other then /proc the selinux policy would > do odd things? No, the logic doesn't care where proc is mounted. Only the name relative to the root of proc is used. -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kernel-testers" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
