Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > On Thu, 2008-09-18 at 08:38 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: >> I do however think that the mantra that we can't require users to update >> policy for kernel changes is unsupportable in general. The precise set >> of permission checks on a given operation is not set in stone and it is >> not part of the kernel/userland interface/contract. Policy isn't >> "userspace"; it governs what userspace can do, and it has to adapt to >> kernel changes. > > I should note here that for changes to SELinux, we have gone out of our > way to avoid such breakage to date through the introduction of > compatibility switches, policy flags to enable any new checks, etc > (albeit at a cost in complexity and ever creeping compatibility code). > But changes to the rest of the kernel can just as easily alter the set > of permission checks that get applied on a given operation, and I don't > think we are always going to be able to guarantee that new kernel + old > policy will Just Work. I know of at least 2 more directories that I intend to turn into symlinks into somewhere under /proc/self. How do we keep from breaking selinux policies when I do that? For comparison how do we handle sysfs? How do we handle device nodes in tmpfs? Ultimately do we want to implement xattrs and inotify on /proc? Or is there another way that would simplify maintenance? Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kernel-testers" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
