On Tue, 8 Nov 2022 21:05:21 -0400 Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Tue, Nov 08, 2022 at 03:55:20PM -0700, Alex Williamson wrote: > > > > > So why exactly isn't this an issue for VDPA? Are we just burying our > > > > head in the sand that such platforms exists and can still be useful > > > > given the appropriate risk vs reward trade-off? > > > > > > Simply that nobody has asked for it, and might never ask for it. This > > > is all support for old platforms, and there just doesn't seem to be a > > > "real" use case for very new (and actually rare) NIC hardware stuck > > > into ancient platforms with this security problem. > > > > vIOMMU support for interrupt remapping is relatively new, the nesting > > case is important as well. > > This is where we got hit. In the end we fixed the qemu.. > > > > I'd be much more comfortable with this as a system wide iommufd flag > > > if we also tied it to do some demonstration of privilege - eg a > > > requirement to open iommufd with CAP_SYS_RAWIO for instance. > > > > Which is not compatible to existing use cases, which is also why we > > can't invent some way to allow some applications to run without CPU > > mitigations, while requiring it for others as a baseline. > > Isn't it? Didn't we learn that libvirt runs as root and will open and > pass the iommufd as root? We're jumping ahead to native iommufd support here, what happens when VFIO_CONTAINER=n and it's QEMU opening the fds, with only file access privileges? > > > That is the usual protocol for these kinds of insecurities.. > > > > Hmm, is it? > > I think so. At least you should have something to shut down an > insecure feature in kernel lockdown modes. CAP_SYS_RAWIO is a simple > way to do it. How are CPU vulnerabilities handled in lockdown mode, do apps require certain capabilities to run fast vs safe, or do we simply disallow unsafe globally in lockdown? I think we have a lot more leniency to ignore/disallow flags that enable global insecurities when any sort of lockdown is imposed. > > > I think right now we can leave this as-is and we can wait for some > > > more information to decide how best to proceed. > > > > It's certainly not acceptable in the latest proposal, iommufd consumes > > an option set by another module and when that module goes away, so does > > any claim of compatibility. The code becomes dead and the feature not > > present. The option doesn't belong on the vfio module. Do we need a > > vfio-iommufd module to host it? Thanks, > > I don't know, as I said in the other email, these little things need > work and discussion to resolve. We need to recheck the security stuff > against the 2022 kernel where things have changed. We don't need to do > it all right now. > > People who want allow_unsafe_interrupts to work will simply not set > VFIO_CONTAINER=n at this time. Same with P2P, vfio-no-iommu and any > other gaps we haven't discovered. > > vfio-iommufd seems like overkill, I think your first suggestion to put > in vfio.ko was more practical. Convenient perhaps, but architecturally the wrong place for it. > My only doubt is if we should make it system wide for everything - and > I'm just a bit uncomfortable with that from a security POV. But maybe > I don't quite know exactly what the risks are. There's a paper about these sorts of attacks here[1]. As I noted earlier, a non-malicious DMA targeting an address that would trigger an interrupt is extremely unlikely, and the resulting vulnerability is largely more of a denial of service, IIRC. It would certainly be strongly dis-recommended in any scenario where the userspace drivers are untrusted, such as a cloud hosting provider, but there are certainly other scenarios where either the guest or userspace drivers are also under the control of the hosting provider and this is not such a concern. Thanks, Alex [1]https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2011/Software%20Attacks%20on%20Intel%20VT-d.pdf
