Re: [PATCH v2 13/16] drm/i915/pxp: User interface for Protected buffer

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On 3/8/2021 1:01 PM, Lionel Landwerlin wrote:
On 08/03/2021 22:40, Rodrigo Vivi wrote:
On Wed, Mar 03, 2021 at 05:24:34PM -0800, Daniele Ceraolo Spurio wrote:

On 3/3/2021 4:10 PM, Daniele Ceraolo Spurio wrote:

On 3/3/2021 3:42 PM, Lionel Landwerlin wrote:
On 04/03/2021 01:25, Daniele Ceraolo Spurio wrote:

On 3/3/2021 3:16 PM, Lionel Landwerlin wrote:
On 03/03/2021 23:59, Daniele Ceraolo Spurio wrote:

On 3/3/2021 12:39 PM, Lionel Landwerlin wrote:
On 01/03/2021 21:31, Daniele Ceraolo Spurio wrote:
From: Bommu Krishnaiah <krishnaiah.bommu@xxxxxxxxx>

This api allow user mode to create Protected buffers. Only contexts
marked as protected are allowed to operate on protected buffers.

We only allow setting the flags at creation time.

All protected objects that have backing storage will be considered
invalid when the session is destroyed and they
won't be usable anymore.

This is a rework of the original code by Bommu Krishnaiah. I've
authorship unchanged since significant chunks
have not been modified.

v2: split context changes, fix defines and
improve documentation (Chris),
      add object invalidation logic

Signed-off-by: Bommu Krishnaiah <krishnaiah.bommu@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio
<daniele.ceraolospurio@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Telukuntla Sreedhar <sreedhar.telukuntla@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Kondapally Kalyan <kalyan.kondapally@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Gupta Anshuman <Anshuman.Gupta@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Huang Sean Z <sean.z.huang@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
   drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_create.c | 27 +++++++++++--
   .../gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c | 10 +++++
   drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object.c |  6 +++
   drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object.h | 12 ++++++
   .../gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object_types.h | 13 ++++++
   drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c
| 40 +++++++++++++++++++
   drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.h | 13 ++++++
   drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp_types.h |  5 +++
   include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h | 22 ++++++++++
   9 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git
a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_create.c
b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_create.c
index 3ad3413c459f..d02e5938afbe 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_create.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_create.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
     #include "gem/i915_gem_ioctls.h"
   #include "gem/i915_gem_region.h"
+#include "pxp/intel_pxp.h"
     #include "i915_drv.h"
   #include "i915_user_extensions.h"
@@ -13,7 +14,8 @@ static int
   i915_gem_create(struct drm_file *file,
           struct intel_memory_region *mr,
           u64 *size_p,
-        u32 *handle_p)
+        u32 *handle_p,
+        u64 user_flags)
   {
       struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj;
       u32 handle;
@@ -35,12 +37,17 @@ i915_gem_create(struct drm_file *file,
         GEM_BUG_ON(size != obj->base.size);
   +    obj->user_flags = user_flags;
+
       ret = drm_gem_handle_create(file, &obj->base, &handle);
       /* drop reference from allocate - handle holds it now */
       i915_gem_object_put(obj);
       if (ret)
           return ret;
   +    if (user_flags & I915_GEM_OBJECT_PROTECTED)
+        intel_pxp_object_add(obj);
+
       *handle_p = handle;
       *size_p = size;
       return 0;
@@ -89,11 +96,12 @@ i915_gem_dumb_create(struct drm_file *file,
       return i915_gem_create(file,
intel_memory_region_by_type(to_i915(dev),
                                  mem_type),
-                   &args->size, &args->handle);
+                   &args->size, &args->handle, 0);
   }
     struct create_ext {
       struct drm_i915_private *i915;
+    unsigned long user_flags;
   };
     static int __create_setparam(struct
drm_i915_gem_object_param *args,
@@ -104,6 +112,19 @@ static int
__create_setparam(struct
drm_i915_gem_object_param *args,
           return -EINVAL;
       }
   +    switch (lower_32_bits(args->param)) {
+    case I915_OBJECT_PARAM_PROTECTED_CONTENT:
+        if (!intel_pxp_is_enabled(&ext_data->i915->gt.pxp))
+            return -ENODEV;
+        if (args->size) {
+            return -EINVAL;
+        } else if (args->data) {
+            ext_data->user_flags |= I915_GEM_OBJECT_PROTECTED;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    break;
+    }
+
       return -EINVAL;
   }
   @@ -148,5 +169,5 @@
i915_gem_create_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev,
void *data,
       return i915_gem_create(file,
intel_memory_region_by_type(i915,
INTEL_MEMORY_SYSTEM),
-                   &args->size, &args->handle);
+                   &args->size, &args->handle,
ext_data.user_flags);
   }
diff --git
a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
index e503c9f789c0..d10c4fcb6aec 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
   #include "gt/intel_gt_buffer_pool.h"
   #include "gt/intel_gt_pm.h"
   #include "gt/intel_ring.h"
+#include "pxp/intel_pxp.h"
     #include "pxp/intel_pxp.h"
   @@ -500,6 +501,15 @@ eb_validate_vma(struct i915_execbuffer *eb,
                entry->offset !=
gen8_canonical_addr(entry->offset &
I915_GTT_PAGE_MASK)))
           return -EINVAL;
   +    if (i915_gem_object_is_protected(vma->obj)) {
+        if (!intel_pxp_is_active(&vma->vm->gt->pxp))
+            return -ENODEV;
+        if (!i915_gem_object_has_valid_protection(vma->obj))
+            return -EIO;
+        if
(!i915_gem_context_can_use_protected_content(eb->gem_context))
+            return -EPERM;

I think I'm running into this error.
The currently agreed design is that protected objects
can only be used with explicitly marked contexts,
although it's not an HW requirement so we can revisit
it.

When running vkcube protected under wayland, it
takes down the entire session (Xorg & gnome-shell
depending on which one is going to use the protected
buffer first).
Are you saying that a single submission failure takes
down the entire gnome session? that sounds like a larger
problem than just this failure. Or am I misunderstanding
your point?

We just need to hand that buffer to any other app and have
it use it in execbuf and that will make it fail the execbuf.

Now how does the driver in the gnome-shell/Xorg process know
what went wrong and what buffer caused it?

Could be any imported buffer. It's pretty hard to recover
from this and most apps will just crash if the driver starts
to fail for some reason.

You can see how that could make a lot of people's live terrible :/
Don't other apps have to know that the buffer is encrypted to
use it properly? Or is there a case where we want to use the
object as if it wasn't encrypted?

Also, PXP submissions can become invalid at any point in time
due to a teardown event, which causes the contents of the
encrypted buffers to become garbage. If we can't fail the
execbuf which includes an invalidated buffer we'd have to
silently discard the submission.

A malicious app could start sharing protected tagged buffer with no
protected content in it, just to invalidate/crash others apps'
context.
I see your point, although on the other side failing the execbuf when
malicious behavior is detected seems reasonable as well.

Can the failure be only reported to protected contexts?
That would allow a non-protected context to use protected objects, which
is something we wanted to avoid.
I see a few options here:

- live with the execbuf failure on incorrect or malicious behavior
could you please expand this option a bit further?

This is basically leaving things as they are now in this series.

Based on the scenario that Lionel described I'm not feeling this is viable...

- silently fail execbuf if protected objects are used with non-protected
contexts
I don't like to simply silent to ignore the execbuf with no indication.
How userspace will know it needs to resubmit the job?


A normal/unprotected context wouldn't resubmit anyway because it wouldn't have the logic the handle this case.

Initially I thought that the failure would only appear on protected contexts, because they want to present protected content properly and so if anything goes wrong in the protected flow, they need to know.


The problem with only failing on protected contexts is that an app could, maliciously or erroneously, use an unprotected context to do protected operations (no restriction on that at the HW level), which would make tracking and banning protected submissions more complicated.


But an application like gnome-shell/Xorg should probably not be affected if they don't support protected content.


-Lionel



- remove the restriction on protected objects being usable only by
protected contexts

Rodrigo, Joonas, any preference or other suggestion here?

BTW, whatever we decide has to also consider the other failure cases in the
check above:
- pxp not active, i.e. termination in progress
- invalid buffer (encrypted using old keys)
yeap. That's the case on the current design.

Is an option to save that "token" with buffers and contexts?


This still wouldn't help with the scenario Lionel described, where an app is unknowingly provided a protected or invalid buffer to use. No matter how we save or check it, the open is still if we want to allow that invalid submission or reject it.

Daniele

Joonas?

Both of those could currently cause an execbuf failure even if we ignore the protected context restriction, which IMO makes the third option above not
viable.

Daniele

Daniele


-Lionel


Daniele


-Lionel


That's a bit harsh.


We probably don't want this. After all the point of
encryption is that even if you can read the buffer
you won't be able to make much of its content.
As mentioned above we can change this since there is no
HW requirement on contexts, but need some architectural
agreement. Joonas and Rodrigo can comment more here.
Also note that submitting an instruction using encrypted
data while the session is invalid can cause the HW to
hang, which is part of the reason why we require the
contexts using protected objects to be marked
appropriately, so we can ban them on PXP teardown to
avoid hangs.

Daniele

Also useful to know you're dealing for debugging ;)


-Lionel


+    }
+
       /* pad_to_size was once a reserved field, so sanitize it */
       if (entry->flags & EXEC_OBJECT_PAD_TO_SIZE) {
           if (unlikely(offset_in_page(entry->pad_to_size)))
diff --git
a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object.c
b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object.c
index 6cdff5fc5882..b321f5484ae6 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
   #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
     #include "display/intel_frontbuffer.h"
+#include "pxp/intel_pxp.h"
   #include "i915_drv.h"
   #include "i915_gem_clflush.h"
   #include "i915_gem_context.h"
@@ -72,6 +73,8 @@ void
i915_gem_object_init(struct drm_i915_gem_object
*obj,
       INIT_LIST_HEAD(&obj->lut_list);
       spin_lock_init(&obj->lut_lock);
   +    INIT_LIST_HEAD(&obj->pxp_link);
+
       spin_lock_init(&obj->mmo.lock);
       obj->mmo.offsets = RB_ROOT;
   @@ -120,6 +123,9 @@ static void
i915_gem_close_object(struct drm_gem_object
*gem, struct drm_file *f
       struct i915_lut_handle *lut, *ln;
       LIST_HEAD(close);
   +    if (i915_gem_object_has_valid_protection(obj))
+        intel_pxp_object_remove(obj);
+
       spin_lock(&obj->lut_lock);
       list_for_each_entry_safe(lut, ln, &obj->lut_list, obj_link) {
           struct i915_gem_context *ctx = lut->ctx;
diff --git
a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object.h
b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object.h
index 366d23afbb1a..a1fa7539c0f7 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object.h
@@ -274,6 +274,18 @@
i915_gem_object_needs_async_cancel(const struct
drm_i915_gem_object *obj)
       return i915_gem_object_type_has(obj,
I915_GEM_OBJECT_ASYNC_CANCEL);
   }
   +static inline bool
+i915_gem_object_is_protected(const struct
drm_i915_gem_object *obj)
+{
+    return obj->user_flags & I915_GEM_OBJECT_PROTECTED;
+}
+
+static inline bool
+i915_gem_object_has_valid_protection(const
struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj)
+{
+    return i915_gem_object_is_protected(obj) &&
!list_empty(&obj->pxp_link);
+}
+
   static inline bool
   i915_gem_object_is_framebuffer(const struct
drm_i915_gem_object *obj)
   {
diff --git
a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object_types.h
b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object_types.h
index 0a1fdbac882e..6eee580c7aba 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object_types.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_object_types.h
@@ -167,6 +167,11 @@ struct drm_i915_gem_object {
       } mmo;
         I915_SELFTEST_DECLARE(struct list_head st_link);
+    /**
+     * @user_flags: small set of booleans set by the user
+     */
+    unsigned long user_flags;
+#define I915_GEM_OBJECT_PROTECTED BIT(0)
         unsigned long flags;
   #define I915_BO_ALLOC_CONTIGUOUS BIT(0)
@@ -290,6 +295,14 @@ struct drm_i915_gem_object {
           bool dirty:1;
       } mm;
   +    /*
+     * When the PXP session is invalidated, we
need to mark all protected
+     * objects as invalid. To easily do so we
add them all to a list. The
+     * presence on the list is used to check if
the encryption is valid or
+     * not.
+     */
+    struct list_head pxp_link;
+
       /** Record of address bit 17 of each page at last unbind. */
       unsigned long *bit_17;
   diff --git
a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c
b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c
index 5912e4a12d94..03151cd7f4b8 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ void intel_pxp_init(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
           return;
         mutex_init(&pxp->mutex);
+    spin_lock_init(&pxp->lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pxp->protected_objects);
         /*
        * we'll use the completion to check if
there is a termination pending,
@@ -136,11 +138,49 @@ int
intel_pxp_wait_for_termination_completion(struct
intel_pxp *pxp)
       return ret;
   }
   +int intel_pxp_object_add(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj)
+{
+    struct intel_pxp *pxp = &to_i915(obj->base.dev)->gt.pxp;
+
+    if (!intel_pxp_is_enabled(pxp))
+        return -ENODEV;
+
+    if (!list_empty(&obj->pxp_link))
+        return -EEXIST;
+
+    spin_lock_irq(&pxp->lock);
+    list_add(&obj->pxp_link, &pxp->protected_objects);
+    spin_unlock_irq(&pxp->lock);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void intel_pxp_object_remove(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj)
+{
+    struct intel_pxp *pxp = &to_i915(obj->base.dev)->gt.pxp;
+
+    if (!intel_pxp_is_enabled(pxp))
+        return;
+
+    spin_lock_irq(&pxp->lock);
+    list_del_init(&obj->pxp_link);
+    spin_unlock_irq(&pxp->lock);
+}
+
   void intel_pxp_invalidate(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
   {
       struct drm_i915_private *i915 = pxp_to_gt(pxp)->i915;
+    struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj, *tmp;
       struct i915_gem_context *ctx, *cn;
   +    /* delete objects that have been used
with the invalidated session */
+    spin_lock_irq(&pxp->lock);
+    list_for_each_entry_safe(obj, tmp,
&pxp->protected_objects, pxp_link) {
+        if (i915_gem_object_has_pages(obj))
+ list_del_init(&obj->pxp_link);
+    }
+    spin_unlock_irq(&pxp->lock);
+
       /* ban all contexts marked as protected */
spin_lock_irq(&i915->gem.contexts.lock);
       list_for_each_entry_safe(ctx, cn,
&i915->gem.contexts.list, link) {
diff --git
a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.h
b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.h
index e36200833095..3315b07d271b 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.h
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
   #include "gt/intel_gt_types.h"
   #include "intel_pxp_types.h"
   +struct drm_i915_gem_object;
+
   #define GEN12_DISPLAY_PXP_STATE_TERMINATED_INTERRUPT BIT(1)
   #define GEN12_DISPLAY_APP_TERMINATED_PER_FW_REQ_INTERRUPT BIT(2)
   #define GEN12_DISPLAY_STATE_RESET_COMPLETE_INTERRUPT BIT(3)
@@ -38,6 +40,9 @@ void intel_pxp_init(struct intel_pxp *pxp);
   void intel_pxp_fini(struct intel_pxp *pxp);
     int
intel_pxp_wait_for_termination_completion(struct
intel_pxp *pxp);
+
+int intel_pxp_object_add(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj);
+void intel_pxp_object_remove(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj);
   void intel_pxp_invalidate(struct intel_pxp *pxp);
   #else
   static inline void intel_pxp_init(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
@@ -52,6 +57,14 @@ static inline int
intel_pxp_wait_for_termination_completion(struct
intel_pxp *px
   {
       return 0;
   }
+
+static inline int intel_pxp_object_add(struct
drm_i915_gem_object *obj)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+static inline void
intel_pxp_object_remove(struct
drm_i915_gem_object *obj)
+{
+}
   #endif
     #endif /* __INTEL_PXP_H__ */
diff --git
a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp_types.h
b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp_types.h
index 6f659a6f8f1c..53a2a8acfe51 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp_types.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp_types.h
@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@
   #define __INTEL_PXP_TYPES_H__
     #include <linux/completion.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
   #include <linux/types.h>
   #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
   #include <linux/workqueue.h>
     struct intel_context;
@@ -28,6 +30,9 @@ struct intel_pxp {
       struct work_struct irq_work;
       bool irq_enabled;
       u32 current_events; /* protected with gt->irq_lock */
+
+    struct spinlock lock;
+    struct list_head protected_objects;
   };
     #endif /* __INTEL_PXP_TYPES_H__ */
diff --git a/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h
b/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h
index 9ebe8523aa0c..0f8b771a6d53 100644
--- a/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h
@@ -1753,6 +1753,28 @@ struct drm_i915_gem_object_param {
    */
   #define I915_OBJECT_PARAM  (1ull << 32)
   +/*
+ * I915_OBJECT_PARAM_PROTECTED_CONTENT:
+ *
+ * If set to true, buffer contents is expected
to be protected by PXP
+ * encryption and requires decryption for scan
out and processing. This is
+ * only possible on platforms that have PXP
enabled, on all other scenarios
+ * setting this flag will cause the ioctl to
fail and return -ENODEV.
+ *
+ * Protected buffers can only be used with
contexts created using the
+ * I915_CONTEXT_PARAM_PROTECTED_CONTENT flag.
The buffer contents are
+ * considered invalid after a PXP session teardown.
+ *
+ * Given the restriction above, the following
errors are possible when
+ * submitting a protected object in an execbuf call:
+ *
+ * -ENODEV: PXP session not currently active
+ * -EIO: buffer has become invalid after a teardown event
+ * -EPERM: buffer submitted using a context not
marked as protected
+ */
+#define I915_OBJECT_PARAM_PROTECTED_CONTENT 0x0
+/* Must be kept compact -- no holes and well documented */
+
       __u64 param;
         /* Data value or pointer */

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