On 07.02.2020 16:39, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > On 07.02.2020 14:38, Thomas Gleixner wrote: >> Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: >>> On 22.01.2020 17:25, Alexey Budankov wrote: >>>> On 22.01.2020 17:07, Stephen Smalley wrote: >>>>>> It keeps the implementation simple and readable. The implementation is more >>>>>> performant in the sense of calling the API - one capable() call for CAP_PERFMON >>>>>> privileged process. >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, it bloats audit log for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged and unprivileged processes, >>>>>> but this bloating also advertises and leverages using more secure CAP_PERFMON >>>>>> based approach to use perf_event_open system call. >>>>> >>>>> I can live with that. We just need to document that when you see >>>>> both a CAP_PERFMON and a CAP_SYS_ADMIN audit message for a process, >>>>> try only allowing CAP_PERFMON first and see if that resolves the >>>>> issue. We have a similar issue with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH versus >>>>> CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. >>>> >>>> perf security [1] document can be updated, at least, to align and document >>>> this audit logging specifics. >>> >>> And I plan to update the document right after this patch set is accepted. >>> Feel free to let me know of the places in the kernel docs that also >>> require update w.r.t CAP_PERFMON extension. >> >> The documentation update wants be part of the patch set and not planned >> to be done _after_ the patch set is merged. > > Well, accepted. It is going to make patches #11 and beyond. Patches #11 and #12 of v7 [1] contain information on CAP_PERFMON intention and usage. Patch for man-pages [2] extends perf_event_open.2 documentation. Thanks, Alexey --- [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c8de937a-0b3a-7147-f5ef-69f467e87a13@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/18d1083d-efe5-f5f8-c531-d142c0e5c1a8@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ _______________________________________________ Intel-gfx mailing list Intel-gfx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx