On Mon, 17 Feb 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Open access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and > namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the > access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of > CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials > and makes operation more secure. > > CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance > monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 > principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states > that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., > capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only > for the time that such privileges are actually required) > > For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem > remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN > usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to > CAP_PERFMON capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> -- James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx> _______________________________________________ Intel-gfx mailing list Intel-gfx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
