On 2/12/20 10:21 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
On 2/12/20 8:53 AM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
On 12.02.2020 16:32, Stephen Smalley wrote:
On 2/12/20 3:53 AM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
Hi Stephen,
On 22.01.2020 17:07, Stephen Smalley wrote:
On 1/22/20 5:45 AM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
On 21.01.2020 21:27, Alexey Budankov wrote:
On 21.01.2020 20:55, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
On Tue, Jan 21, 2020 at 9:31 AM Alexey Budankov
<alexey.budankov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 21.01.2020 17:43, Stephen Smalley wrote:
On 1/20/20 6:23 AM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
<SNIP>
Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system
performance
Why _noaudit()? Normally only used when a permission failure
is non-fatal to the operation. Otherwise, we want the audit
message.
So far so good, I suggest using the simplest version for v6:
static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
{
return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
}
It keeps the implementation simple and readable. The
implementation is more
performant in the sense of calling the API - one capable() call
for CAP_PERFMON
privileged process.
Yes, it bloats audit log for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged and
unprivileged processes,
but this bloating also advertises and leverages using more secure
CAP_PERFMON
based approach to use perf_event_open system call.
I can live with that. We just need to document that when you see
both a CAP_PERFMON and a CAP_SYS_ADMIN audit message for a process,
try only allowing CAP_PERFMON first and see if that resolves the
issue. We have a similar issue with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH versus
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.
I am trying to reproduce this double logging with CAP_PERFMON.
I am using the refpolicy version with enabled perf_event tclass [1],
in permissive mode.
When running perf stat -a I am observing this AVC audit messages:
type=AVC msg=audit(1581496695.666:8691): avc: denied { open } for
pid=2779 comm="perf" scontext=user_u:user_r:user_systemd_t
tcontext=user_u:user_r:user_systemd_t tclass=perf_event permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1581496695.666:8691): avc: denied { kernel }
for pid=2779 comm="perf" scontext=user_u:user_r:user_systemd_t
tcontext=user_u:user_r:user_systemd_t tclass=perf_event permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1581496695.666:8691): avc: denied { cpu } for
pid=2779 comm="perf" scontext=user_u:user_r:user_systemd_t
tcontext=user_u:user_r:user_systemd_t tclass=perf_event permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1581496695.666:8692): avc: denied { write }
for pid=2779 comm="perf" scontext=user_u:user_r:user_systemd_t
tcontext=user_u:user_r:user_systemd_t tclass=perf_event permissive=1
However there is no capability related messages around. I suppose my
refpolicy should
be modified somehow to observe capability related AVCs.
Could you please comment or clarify on how to enable caps related
AVCs in order
to test the concerned logging.
The new perfmon permission has to be defined in your policy; you'll
have a message in dmesg about "Permission perfmon in class
capability2 not defined in policy.". You can either add it to the
common cap2 definition in refpolicy/policy/flask/access_vectors and
rebuild your policy or extract your base module as CIL, add it there,
and insert the updated module.
Yes, I already have it like this:
common cap2
{
<------>mac_override<--># unused by SELinux
<------>mac_admin
<------>syslog
<------>wake_alarm
<------>block_suspend
<------>audit_read
<------>perfmon
}
dmesg stopped reporting perfmon as not defined but audit.log still
doesn't report CAP_PERFMON denials.
BTW, audit even doesn't report CAP_SYS_ADMIN denials, however
perfmon_capable() does check for it.
Some denials may be silenced by dontaudit rules; semodule -DB will strip
those and semodule -B will restore them. Other possibility is that the
process doesn't have CAP_PERFMON in its effective set and therefore
never reaches SELinux at all; denied first by the capability module.
Also, the fact that your denials are showing up in user_systemd_t
suggests that something is off in your policy or userspace/distro; I
assume that is a domain type for the systemd --user instance, but your
shell and commands shouldn't be running in that domain (user_t would be
more appropriate for that).
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